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 Non technical summary 
 
In this study, we try to connect the economic literature on human capital formation 
with the biological and psychological literature on early childhood development and 
self-regulation. Our basic framework for assessing the distribution of age-specific 
returns to investment in skills is an elaboration of the model of skill formation from 
Cunha, Heckman et al. (2006) over the life cycle. We illustrate the cumulative and 
synergetic nature of skill formation in a framework where learning abilities differ 
with respect to age and may differ between individuals and where individuals face 
heterogeneous environments. Student achievement scores and human capital are 
modelled explicitly as a function of cognitive and self-regulatory skills. Institutional 
aspects of labour markets which may shape the distribution of human capital are 
taken into account in the simulation model.  
 
The impact of educational polices which aim at enhancing skills is evaluated in 
terms of their longer run multiplier effects. Various age- and skill-specific invest-
ment strategies are appreciated with respect to individual returns to education, with 
respect to the overall human capital of the population as well as with respect to its 
allocation among the members of society. Individual educational choices are inves-
tigated for tertiary investments to maximize human capital, while for preschool, pri-
mary and secondary education the impact of different investment strategies are as-
sessed without a particular model of choice. The parameters of the simulation model 
are adjusted in a way such that the formation of intelligence and self-regulation 
across the life span in our population reproduces facts and stylized facts from the 
development of cognitive and self-regulatory skills, the student reading achievement 
scores from PISA 2000 and the inequality of wages in Germany in 2004.  
 
Our simulation based evidence illustrates the shaping role early childhood has for 
human capital formation, growth and inequality. Skills beget skills and early in-
vestment has higher returns than later ones. Differences in individual giftedness 
have a higher impact on inequality of skills and human capital than differences 
stemming from the environment. A reasonable strategy for fostering human capital 
is to supply children with symmetric impulses into cognitive and self-regulatory 
skills until they reach adolescence. In adult age, however, more investments should 
be directed to improve self-regulatory skills. If it is not possible to invest in early 
childhood for whatever reasons, increased life expectancy seems to enhance the re-
turns of tertiary education specifically for students from more disadvantaged envi-
ronments. The relative gains from tertiary instead of primary additional education 
seem to be the higher the longer life expectancy lasts. In future research, improved 
longitudinal and cross-section data, both experimental and non-experimental, could 
be collected to upgrade the empirical understanding of the cumulative and syner-
getic nature of skill formation and the way families, schools and policies shape the 
future workforce.  
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1 Introduction 
 
“If a picture (graph) is worth a thousand words, then a model is worth a thousand pictures (graphs)”,  
F. Cunha, J.J. Heckman, L. Lochner, D. V. Masterov (2006, p.704).  
 
Multiple skills are required for the formation of human capital. Besides of intelli-
gence and language skills, motivation, self-regulation and social integration play an 
important role. The formation of cognitive skills depends on self-regulatory, non-
cognitive skills and vice versa and may vary between individuals and throughout the 
life span. Skill formation continues from birth until old-age and feedback effects be-
tween families, schools, peer groups and the labor market are important for individ-
ual development. The formation of skills is a cumulative, synergetic process which 
is affected by the environment, genetic endowments and both formal and informal 
investments in education.   
 
Since “skills beget skills” (Cunha et al. (2006, p.702)) it follows that early invest-
ments will lead to higher returns than investments later on. Skills acquired in early 
childhood persist and help to build up future skills. The brain of newborns has a high 
degree of openness (see Knudsen et al. (2006)) and skill formation in early child-
hood seems to have lasting effects especially for the development of intelligence and 
self-regulation as well as for student achievement scores, socio-economic success 
and human capital (see Courchese et al. (2000), Cunha et al. (2006), Heckhausen 
and Heckhausen (2006), Rushton and Ankey (1996), among others).  
 
Psychological research, for instance, is devoted to studying the interaction of new-
borns and parents in order to understand the experience of contingency. According 
to Heckhausen and Heckhausen (2006, p. 402) a dynamic, stable and responsive in-
teraction fosters contingency experiences of the newborn which build the foundation 
of effort-regulation, persistence, patience and self-regulation throughout the life. 
Goal oriented action and persistence seem to be helpful for acquiring cognitive skills 
which foster learning in educational institutions and achievement scores later in life. 
If the experience of contingency is missing, the development of self-regulation and 
persistence can be distorted. Because of the cumulative and synergetic nature of skill 
formation this might have cumulative negative consequences for educational and 
labour market outcomes as well as for the formation of human capital.  
 
In this study, we try to connect the economic literature on human capital formation 
with the biological and psychological literature on early childhood development and 
self-regulation. Our basic framework for assessing the distribution of age-specific 
returns to investment in skills is an elaboration of the model of skill formation from 
Cunha, Heckman et al. (2006) over the life cycle. Economics has a long tradition in 
studying the causes and consequences of human capital formation in educational 
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institutions and labour markets (see Heckman et al. (2006), Rubinstein and Weiss 
(2006), among others). The relevance of skill formation in early childhood stems 
from a wealth of experimental and small scale longitudinal studies from biology, 
psychology and neuroscience (see Knudsen et al. (2006), Laucht (2005) and Heck-
hausen and Heckhausen (2006), among others).  
 
However, empirical interdisciplinary research studying the cumulative and syner-
getic nature of investments in skills by families and schools is still hampered by in-
complete data. Reasonable and representative life cycle data with information on the 
amount of investments and the quality of the environment as well as information on 
genetic endowments is largely missing (data in Germany is summarized in Konsor-
tium Bildungsberichterstattung (2006)). Nevertheless, empirical assessments of the 
relative importance of pre-school, primary, secondary and post-secondary public and 
private investments in skills and human capital are crucial for policies in order to 
foster human capital and growth. Since the German economy will be more and more 
based on knowledge and science in the future, human capital is essential not only for 
individual well-being and social inclusion but also for competitiveness and openness 
of the economy.  
 
Since data are incomplete, our contribution to the literature is simulation based evi-
dence which is capable of illustrating the relationship between investment in skills, 
the technology of skill formation and the heterogeneous returns to age-specific in-
vestments in skills across the life span. Future social interdisciplinary research is 
necessary for understanding the types of interventions and investments which are 
helpful and optimal for fostering the different dimensions of skills and human capi-
tal.  
 
The paper is related to the empirical literature on causal effects of schooling on 
wages and its inequality. Researchers are interested in the influence of education on 
various socio-economic outcome variables, among them human capital or wages, 
taking into account selectivity into various educational institutions. Preferences, 
ability, financial constraints and differences in the quality of schools may all influ-
ence the school choice of students which leads to heterogeneous individual returns 
to education. Furthermore, industrialized economies are characterised by continuing 
demographic and technological changes transmitted through labour markets as well 
as their regulation which in addition might influence the returns to education. As a 
consequence, there will be no homogenous or constant effect of an educational ex-
pansion but rather a distribution of individual effects (among others see Blundell et 
al. (2005), Card (2001), Flossmann and Pohlmeier (2006), Heckman et al. (2006) or 
Oreopoulos (2006)).  
 
A significant part of the recent German literature on the returns to education has dis-
cussed data and methodological aspects of estimating returns to education (for re-
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cent surveys see Jochmann and Pohlmeier (2004), Flossmann and Pohlmeier (2006), 
and Pfeiffer (2000), among others). Estimates for homogenous or constant returns to 
education for Germany reveal values between 5 and 10 percent, depending on the 
instruments used, and the estimated average treatment effect of schooling varies be-
tween 4 and 9 percent. Whether the educational expansion form the seventies has 
contributed to rising rather than declining returns to education and the inequality of 
wages which started around 1998 is an issue of continuing research (Gernandt et al. 
2006, Gebel and Pfeiffer 2007). In our current paper, we would like to address po-
tential reasons for the heterogeneity in returns to education in Germany.  
 
The model of the technology of skill formation is taking into account the changing 
nature of skill formation over the life span and the interdependency of cognitive and 
self-regulatory (non-cognitive) skills. More precisely, significant differences are 
modelled between skill formation both in early childhood and adolescence. On the 
one hand, the formation of a standard investment impulse in skills is the more pro-
ductive the earlier in life it takes place. On the other hand, depreciation processes 
become quantitatively more important later on in life. In our model, the formation of 
skills in a certain period depends on the acquired skills from earlier periods and cur-
rent investments. We simulate skill production functions with the characteristics of 
self-productivity and direct complementarities (Cunha et al. (2006)). The two con-
cepts formalize some basic features of the nature of learning and skill formation: 
 
1. Self-productivity (or recursive productivity): Skills of past periods remain 
productive for the attainment of current skills. 
2. Direct skill complementarity: The higher the skill level the more productive 
may the return of subsequent investments in skills be. 
 
Since skills are multiple by their nature, the technology of skill formation is multi-
dimensional. In our model, the multidimensionality of skills is reduced to the two 
dimensions of cognitive and self-regulatory (non-cognitive) skills. The interactions 
among cognitive and self-regulatory skills and investments in these skills are mod-
elled by a system of two interrelated production functions. The processes of depre-
ciation of skills as well as aging are integrated into the simulation model. Additional 
heterogeneity of individuals stems from different family and social environments, 
different individual learning abilities and different degrees of complementarities be-
tween cognitive and self-regulatory skills in the production functions. In our model, 
human capital is a function of cognitive and self-regulatory skills as well as of mo-
bility and aspects of the labour market such as regulation or the degree of wage 
flexibility.  
 
The value of human capital of a standard simulated individual is adjusted such that it 
is equal to the value of an average German worker from the industry (which is ap-
proximately 900,000 million Euros). Furthermore, heterogeneity of cognitive and 
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self-regulatory skills is adjusted in a way such that their interaction generates the 
distribution of the PISA 2000 achievement scores in reading for 16 year old German 
students.  But the inequality of human capital is not only influenced by the hetero-
geneity of skills. Differences in individual mobility, labour markets and their institu-
tions will transform skills into human capital and wages as well. Thus, the inequality 
of human capital will be adjusted to the ratio of the ninetieth to tenth percentile of 
the distribution of wages, for instance to the one in Germany or other countries. In 
Germany, this ratio was equal to 3 in 2004 compared to 2.5 in 1994 (see Gernandt 
and Pfeiffer (2006)). Thus, our simulation model illustrates the role of skill forma-
tion in early childhood for the growth of human capital (see also Dickens et al. 
(2006)) and changes in wage inequality, for instance.  
 
With these adjustments we utilize the model  
• to assess the distribution of returns to symmetric investment in both types of 
skills in different phases during child- and adulthood (pre-school, primary, 
secondary and post-secondary education), 
• to assess the distribution of returns to investment in motivation and effort-
regulation during different phases of child- and adulthood,  
• to highlight the role of complementarities between cognitive and self-
regulatory skills for the returns to education, 
• to compare the role of socio-economic family backgrounds and individual dif-
ferences in learning capacities for the heterogeneity of returns to education,  
• to highlight the role of life expectancy and age specific depreciation of skills 
for the heterogeneity of returns to education, and 
• to contribute to the understanding of policies in order to foster human capital 
and growth and its distribution in the society.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next chapter we discuss some 
selected empirical evidence on skill acquisition over the whole life span which is 
helpful for justifying the structure and technology of skill formation. Chapter 3 
elaborates the ingredients of the simulation model of skill formation in detail. In 
Chapter 4 we introduce the essential heterogeneity in skills and their formation over 
the life span and the calibration of the model parameters as well. The calibration will 
be based on stylized facts from the German educational and labour market system. 
Chapter 5 discusses various findings from the simulated relationship between the 
technology of skill acquisition and the heterogeneity of returns to education over the 
life cycle. Chapter 6 introduces into the discussion of equity and efficiency of age-
dependent investments into skill formation. Chapter 7 concludes.   
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2. Skill Formation over the Life Cycle  
2.1. Cognitive Skills 
One central function in the technology of skill formation explains the relationship 
between cognitive skills and educational and environmental inputs as the relevant 
output over the life span. This function captures central findings from research on 
the development of the brain and of intelligence which we will briefly summarize in 
this part.  
 
Cognitive skills include the ability to solve problems in general as well as language, 
memory capacity, and the speed of information processing. These skills are often 
measured by IQ tests. To observe the development across the life cycle, tests have 
been conducted for different age groups. Kaufmann et al. (1996) measure the differ-
ences on six core abilities for different age and educational groups ranging from 
ages 15 to 94 (see table 1). Since significant environmental and social changes took 
place during the last decades, Kaufmann et al. (1996) adjust the scores by using the 
education of the tested individuals. In industrialized countries, older generations 
typically score lower in ability tests compared to younger generations due to increas-
ing education and improving environmental conditions during the 20th century 
(Flynn (1987)). 
 
One measure for cognitive skills is the ability of fluid problem solving. In one test 
individuals first have to arrange letters in order to form words and then discover se-
cret letters in words. Fluid problem solving starts with an adjusted mean of 102.2 for 
the age of 15-16 and rises until the age of 20-24 where it peaks at 107.4 (Kaufmann 
et al. (1996)). Subsequently, it decreases with an accelerating speed reaching values 
below 100 at the age of 50, and values of 82.6 for people older than 75. The age 
groups of 60-65 and 65-69 have adjusted means which equal 87 percent of the ad-
justed mean for the 20-24 age groups. 
 
Table 1: Cognitive abilities, brain and age 
 Approximate percentage of maximum value for different ages
Indicator 0 years 6 years 16 years 24 years 65 years 80 years 
Fluid Problem Solving Score - - 95.2 % 100 % 87 % 77 % 
Brain Mass 27.4 % 81.4 % 96 % 100 % 94.5 % 91 % 
Brain Volume 23.6 % 92.9 % 100 % 100 % 82.9 % 75.7 % 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (1996), Courchese et al. (2000), own calculations. 
 
Since differences in IQ tests at the age of ten have a high persistence over the life 
span, environment and investment during childhood are crucial for the formation of 
cognitive skills (see Armor (2003), Caspi (2005), Cunha et al. (2006), Weinert 
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(2001)). These factors include in utero experiences, the way a mother interacts with 
her child, how the parents interact with each other as well as kindergarten and early 
years in school. The younger a child the larger are these influences on later cognitive 
development. Horwood and Fergusson (1998), for instance, study a birth cohort of 
1,265 children in New Zealand and find that the duration of breastfeeding has a di-
rect effect on the WISC-R total IQ score of 8 to 9 year old children. Furthermore, 
they find clear tendencies for a connection between an increasing duration of breast-
feeding and decreasing levels of social and family disadvantage.  
 
Thus, breastfeeding might indicate a positive, intensive relationship between the 
newborn and the mother and this, presumably, contributes to the formation of cogni-
tive as well as other skills. While not breastfed children score with an average 97.78 
IQ points at the age of 9 years, children that were breastfed score with an average of 
102.8 IQ points. Likewise, children that were breastfed for a longer period of time 
score significantly higher in school achievement test scores. For a test score with a 
mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 10, not breastfed children score 97.78 in 
scholastic ability at the age of 13 and children breastfed for more than 8 month score 
with 103.05 points.  
 
One indicator for brain size is the development of total brain volume. Starting with 
about 330 ml at birth, the brain volume for males increases rapidly to 1,300 ml for 6 
year old males, peaks with 1,400 ml at the age of 16 and plateaus until the early 20s 
(Courchese et al. (2000)). Then it reduces to about 1,100 ml until the age of 75 to 80 
being as small as the brain volume of a 2 year old. The brain volume decreases 
about 26 percent from the age of 16 until the age of 71 - 80. This is even larger than 
the decrease of brain weight which is equal to about 9 percent for the same period 
(Courchese et al. (2000), see also Rushton and Ankey (1996) and for an earlier study 
Ho et al. (1980)).  
 
Psychological research indicates that older compared to younger adults tend to have 
difficulties to realize multiple, complex intentions in their memory processes (for 
instance Kliegel et al. (2003)). Studies based on recently developed questionnaires 
like the Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ) also suggest an age-related 
decline of memory performance (Kliegel and Jäger (2006), West (2005)). In addi-
tion to that, there might exist critical periods for the formation of cognitive skills. 
For instance, the language production centre (Broca’s area) starts to develop after 
birth, peaks at the age of 7 months and continually declines afterwards (Oerter and 
Montanda (2002)). Early childhood in combination with the environment where it is 
formed is therefore the period in which the fundaments of cognitive skills are built 
(see also Amor (2003), Cunha et al. (2006)).  
 
To sum up, measures of the brain and of cognitive ability reveal that a newborn has 
about 25-30 percent of the brain mass of a 25 year old adult. In early childhood, the 
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brain grows quickly reaching about 81 percent of the maximum weight and 93 per-
cent of the maximum volume at the age of 6. After the age of 10 intelligence contin-
ues to grow, but further increases of cognitive skills after that age needs more in-
vestments. Starting at the age of 25 until the age of 80, the brain and memory proc-
esses for instance shrink once more and depreciation becomes important. The score 
for fluid problem solving reduces to about 77 percent of its maximum value, brain 
mass to about 91 percent and brain volume to about 74-79 percent. After the age of 
80 the depreciation often seems to accelerate. 
2.2. Self-regulatory Skills 
The second function in the technology of skill formation explains the relationship 
between educational and environmental inputs and self-regulatory or non-cognitive 
skills over the life span. We try to model at least some crucial aspects of motivation 
and volition (effort-regulation and self-control) and its formation over the life cycle 
based on findings from motivation and developmental psychology which we will 
briefly summarize in this part.  
 
Achievement tests measure the performance of children at school (e.g. in reading, 
mathematics). Here not only cognitive abilities, but self-regulatory (non-cognitive) 
skills are important. In order to properly use ones cognitive skills, a person has to be 
prepared for selecting her personal goals from the larger set of available goals 
(called motivation), has to be engaged in activities for achieving these goals (called 
volition) and has to evaluate whether the action was satisfactory (see Achtziger and 
Gollwitzer (2006)). These skills will be summarized in what is implied by the term 
self-regulation (or effort-regulation).  
 
Goals as well as self-regulatory skills may continuously develop from childhood to 
adulthood (see Ericson (1963) and Heckhausen and Heckhausen (2006), among oth-
ers). A significant part of self-regulation seems to be formed in early childhood, de-
pending on the interaction between parents and the newborn. According to Heck-
hausen and Heckhausen (2006) the experience of contingency in these interactions 
(or its absence) is the fundament for motivation, self-regulation, volition and persis-
tence (or its absence) throughout life. Cunha et al. (2006) find that achievement tests 
can be influenced until very high ages. This would suggest that self-regulatory skills 
can be improved more easily during adolescence than cognitive skills, for instance.  
 
The importance of infancy on self-regulatory skills is still a field of considerable re-
search. Based on the studies above our standard assumption will be that the dynamic 
of cognitive skill formation dominates in infancy. In a model variation presented in 
part 6 below it is further discussed how results change under the assumption that in-
fancy is even more important for the development of self-regulatory skills than for 
cognitive development. 
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Individuals seem to differ to a great deal with respect to these skills at all stages of 
the process of action. Psychological research has collected a wealth of findings on 
stereotypes and the role of unconscious actions. Limits to intentionality or goal ori-
ented behaviour may be one consequence (see Ainslie (2001), Eliot and Dweck 
(2005), Heckhausen and Heckhausen (2006), among others). Individuals differ with 
respect to their ability or their willingness to delay gratification (time-preference, 
patience) and by how easily they are distracted (persistence). The impact of self-
regulatory skills on socio-economic outcome variables can be immense. For exam-
ple, Heckman et al. (2006) report that by increasing non-cognitive abilities to their 
highest level the probability for females to drop out of high school is reduced to vir-
tually zero. According to Blanden et al. (2006) 20 percent of the relationship be-
tween parental income and children’s later earnings is explained by the connection 
between parental background and the level of non-cognitive skills of the children.  
 
Attempts to measure self-regulatory skills include the Thematic Apperception Test 
(TAT) (Spangler (1992)). It tries to tap a subject's unconscious to reveal repressed 
aspects of personality, motives and needs for achievement, power and intimacy, and 
problem-solving abilities. Schultheiss (2006) presents a system to elaborate TAT 
results that rates different individual types of motivation driven by the achievements 
motive, the power motive and the affiliation motive. Individuals invest effort in 
achieving different types of motives, thus TAT tests can be a useful indication of 
self-regulatory skills.  
 
In psychology, five major personality traits are distinguished: extraversion, neuroti-
cism, conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness to experience (Caspi et al. 
(2005)). Ashton and Lee (2001) find that, out of the Big Five personality traits, con-
scientiousness shows the highest correlation with various achievement scales. PRF 
(Jackson's Personality Research Form) achievement, for instance, contains items de-
scribing a competitive desire to succeed, a tendency to pursue difficult goals and a 
tendency to become deeply absorbed in hard work. Similarly, the JPI (Jackson Per-
sonality Inventory is widely considered to be one of the most psychometrically 
sound measures of personality) Energy Level scale contains items describing a pref-
erence for vigorous activity and for being busy as well as the tendency to perform 
intense work or recreational activity for long periods of time.  
 
The correlation between the PRF achievement scale and conscientiousness is 0.56 
and 0.3 with the JPI Energy level, respectively. Ashton and Pauonen (2001) report 
correlations between personality traits and school grades. Again, by having a sig-
nificant correlation of 0.21 with school grades, conscientiousness seems to be the 
best predictor of all personality traits. Openness is also closely related, but is not 
well enough defined to be a reliable indicator for self-regulatory or other non-
cognitive skills determining achievement. This is due to the fact that openness con-
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tains some attributes that seem to be positively correlated with school grades and 
others that seem to be negatively correlated in the empirical analysis.  
 
To sum up, even though self-regulatory skills are too diverse to be described by only 
one personality trait, there exists a significant relation to conscientiousness. Roberts 
et al. (2003) examine the development of personality in adulthood. They find that 
conscientiousness increases at a slowing rate starting at the age of 20 until middle 
age where it most likely plateaus. The evidence for self-regulatory development 
throughout old age seems to be more uncertain. However, important personality 
traits like conscientiousness seem to remain at a high level. Chasteen et al. (2001) 
suggest that self-regulatory competences like forming detailed implementation in-
tentions can significantly improve the prospective memory in older individuals 
(mean age: 71 years). This would imply that higher levels of self-regulatory skills 
may compensate for lower level of cognitive skills in old age. 
 
Traditional human capital theory predicts that incentives to invest in ones skills are 
the lower the nearer the age of retirement. Since, in addition to that, individuals in 
old age may suffer from more health problems this may lead to a decline in the mo-
tivation for pursuing other goals. Thus, this suggests that self-regulatory skills reach 
their maximum during mid to old age which is different to cognitive skills reaching 
their maximum during young adult age. 
2.3. The Cumulative and Synergetic Nature of Skill Formation  
Biological and environmental factors as well as their interactions affect the forma-
tion of cognitive and self-regulatory skills. “Skills beget skills” due to self-
productivity and direct complementarities (see Cunha et al. (2006)). The concept of 
self-productivity implies that skills attained in one developmental stage contribute to 
the attainment of further skills later on. To fix ideas, we introduce the formal struc-
ture of our model of skill acquisition which elaborates ideas taken from Cunha et al. 
(2006).  
 
If we define tS  as the level of skill k in period t  the concept of self-productivity is 
captured by the assumption
1
0
k
t
k
t
S
S −
∂ >∂ . The concept of direct complementarities im-
plies that investments in one period are the more productive in increasing the level 
of skills the more investment was conducted in earlier periods. The skill increase 
caused by an investment of a person with higher self-regulatory skills will be higher 
due to a higher level of self-regulation and persistence for using the investment. Fur-
ther on, this will foster cognitive skills as well and may lay the foundation for suc-
cess in academic achievement and in labour markets later in life. Let ktI  indicate in-
vestment in skill k at age t. With a technology of skill formation 1( , )k k kt t t tS f I S −=  the 
 10
concept of direct complementarity of skill l on the output of skill k is an assumption 
related to the second derivative: 
2
1
0
k
t
k l
t t
S
I S −
∂ >∂ ∂ .  
 
Cunha et al. (2006) introduce a production function which takes into account the 
synergetic and cumulative nature of the formation of skills in the following way. In 
t=1 they assume an initial condition of 1 1k kS I= , where k=C for cognitive skills and 
k=N for self-regulatory (non-cognitive) skills. In the following period, t=2, skills are 
produced according to: 
 
{ } 12 1 1 2 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) (1 )( )C C N CS S S Iα α α αγ γ γ γ= + + − −       (1) 
and { } 12 1 1 2 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) (1 )( )N C N NS S S Iσ σ σ σφ φ φ φ= + + − − .     (2) 
with 0 1iγ≤ ≤ , 0 1≤ ≤iφ 1α−∞ ≤ ≤  and 1σ−∞ ≤ ≤ . 
 
The functions have the property of a constant elasticity of substitution where α and 
σ  govern the degree of complementarities between cognitive and self-regulatory 
skills in producing the new levels of skills as well as the degree of complementari-
ties between investments and the amount of skills already available. If 1α = or 1σ =  
the inputs of the production function are perfect substitutes, if α = −∞  or σ = −∞  they 
are perfect complements which implies that all inputs are required in the same pro-
portion since substitution is not possible. Varying the parameters α  and σ  therefore 
allows to model critical as well as sensitive periods in the formation of different 
types of skills and their interaction. 
2.4. Human Capital 
Skill is the term that describes basic mental and physical abilities or competences a 
person acquires during her life span. In economics, the term human capital is used to 
describe the value these skills produce in the labour market or in self-employment. 
The human capital of an individual is thus the individual stream of earnings across 
the life span properly discounted and for example evaluated at the age of 18. The 
returns to investments in skills will be assessed by the enhancement of human capi-
tal. Earnings and wages are determined by individual cognitive and self-regulatory 
skills and may further be determined by institutions like centralized or decentralized 
wage bargaining. The process of earnings starts after finishing school. Since techni-
cal change and a rising degree of specialisation are taking place in modern working 
places, the mobility between firms, occupations and regions is an integral part in the 
formation of human capital for establishing optimal matches between workers and 
jobs.  
 
After schooling, individuals in our model will earn a wage corresponding to their 
human capital until the reach the age of retirement (65 to 70 years). Furthermore, in 
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our simulation model the accumulation of human capital depends on cognitive and 
self-regulatory skills. In Germany, the average wage of a worker at the age of 40 is 
equal to 29,787 Euros in the industry (Statistical Yearbook Germany (2006)). The 
maximum of annual yearly earnings is assumed to be reached at the age of 55 which 
is comparable with empirical studies of earnings over the life cycle (see for example 
Franz (2006)). With these two “fix points” the accumulated nominal sum of human 
capital of a hypothetical worker working from the age of 18 to 65 will be 1.4 Million 
€ in our simulation model. 
 
3. A Model of Skill and Human Capital Formation 
In our simulation model of skill and human capital development over the life span, 
each period t is supposed to be equivalent to one year of life. The theory behind 
equations (1) and (2) above provides a useful starting point for the development of 
the technology of skill formation across the life span, but for achieving our goal we 
need to impose more structure on the formation of cognitive and self-regulatory 
skills. 
 
In principle, the relationship between in- and outputs may vary from year to year or 
between some well defined developmental phases. This would imply that all pa-
rameters of the production functions change. We chose an enhanced system of the 
two equations that specifies skill acquisition and depreciation on a yearly basis. The 
cumulative nature of learning is taken into account, together with the depreciation of 
skills. The plasticity of skills (Cunha et al. (2007)) and the relative amounts of add-
ing new skills and losing available skills is changing with age. This implies for skill 
k: 
1 1 -1− −= + −k k k kt t t tS learning S losing         (3) 
3.1. Skill Formation 
On average, a young child learns easily even though it accumulated only a few skills 
during its short life. An older person, on the other side, managed to collect a high 
level of skills, but doesn’t learn as fast as the young child with only a few skills. To 
model these differences we add two learning multipliers determining the persons’ 
learning aptitude and depending on age to the basic function of skill formation, one 
for cognitive, Ctl , and one for non-cognitive skills, Ntl , respectively. For the moment 
we assume that 1 2 1 2
1
3
γ = γ = φ = φ =  , α = σ . 
1
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )
3 3 3
⎧ ⎫= + +⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
C C C C N C
t t t t tlearning l S S I
αα α αψ δ      (4) 
1
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )
3 3 3
⎧ ⎫= + +⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
N N N C N N
t t t t tlearning l S S I
αα α αψ δ      (5) 
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α  determines the degree of complementarities between cognitive and self-regulatory 
skills and ψC  and ψN are some arbitrary adjustment factors for the units to measure 
skills. δ  represents an individuals ability to transform investments into skills and is 
set equal to one for an average individual.  
 
Early childhood is the most critical period for the development of skills. Within the 
first six years of life, the human brain has completed about 81-93 % of its total 
growth (see part 2, table 1).  
 
Growth processes of synapses and axons in the brain during early childhood inspired 
the numerical values of the cognitive multiplier. The visual and auditory cortex 
starts to develop shortly before birth having its fastest growth at the age of one 
month (Oerter and Montanda (2002)). From then on, the growing speed continu-
ously declines. The development of the speech production centre (Broca’s area) 
starts after birth as well, but peaks at the age of 7 months continually declining af-
terwards. The prefrontal cortex, being responsible for various regulation functions 
(e.g. planning complex cognitive behaviour, personality expression and moderating 
correct social behaviour), has its most rapid growth at the age of one to three years. 
It continues to grow during childhood until the age of 12 with a slowing speed. The 
numerical values for the cognitive learning multiplier, Ctl , from t=0 to t=80 are illus-
trated in Figure 1 for the period of 0 to 20 years. From 20 to 80 years they are as-
sumed to slowly decrease to zero. 
 
Figure 1: Cognitive learning multiplier from age 0 to 20 
1
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Self-regulatory skills seem to remain more malleable in adult age (see Cunha et al. 
(2006)), although this is subject to continuing research (see Heckhausen and Heck-
hausen (2006)). Personality traits closely related to some aspects of self-regulatory 
skills like conscientiousness or openness increase throughout young adult age until 
at least the age of 40. Some of these empirical findings guided the way in which we 
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model the numerical values of the non-cognitive learning multiplier, Ntl , as illus-
trated in Figure 2 from period 0 to 60.  In adolescence and adult age Ntl  is signifi-
cantly larger than Ctl . 
 
Figure 2: Self-regulatory learning multiplier from age 0 to 60 
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3.2. Depreciation of Skills 
Research on the plasticity of the brain suggests that new neurons are formed con-
tinuously, however with a declining tendency across the life span (see Sugawa et al. 
(1996)). Since the depreciation of skills takes place all life, but with an increasing 
tendency, we may distinguish periods of growth from the decline of skill levels. Let 
tv  be the number of periods needed until a person will loose all his skills completely 
given that no new investment takes place. Let = =C Nt t tv v v . Furthermore it is assumed 
that 0∂ <∂
tv
t
 and 
2
2 0
∂ =∂
tv
t
. The loss of skills increases with age, but the decrease in the 
loss of tv  is assumed to be constant. Let as be the speed of aging within each period 
and let Le be life expectancy. Le is defined as the number of periods needed un-
til 0=tv , defined as the moment when the individual loses all its skills immediately 
which can be interpreted as the death of this individual. For simplification we as-
sume that Le=80 for all individuals in our simulation. This parameter will be 
changed for investigating its relevance for investments in skills. These assumptions 
lead to the following function for tν  : 
 
( )= ⋅ −tv as Le t           (6) 
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For the starting period this implies: 0 = ⋅v as Le . If tv  is the amount of time it takes to 
depreciate the skill level to zero, annual depreciation will be: 
( )
= ⋅ −
C
C t
t
Slosing
as Le t
         (7) 
and 
( )
= ⋅ −
N
N t
t
Slosing
as Le t
         (8) 
3.3. The Model of Skill Formation in Equations 
By substituting (4) and (7) into (3) one obtains equation 9 for cognitive skills: 
1
1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )
3 3 3 [ ( 1)]
−
− − − − −
⎧ ⎫= ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ ⋅ + −⎨ ⎬ ⋅ − −⎩ ⎭
C
C C C C N C C t
t t t t t t
SS l S S I S
as Le t
αα α αψ δ   (9) 
and equation 10 for self-regulatory (non-cognitive skills): 
1
1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )
3 3 3 [ ( 1)]
−
− − − − −
⎧ ⎫= ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ ⋅ + −⎨ ⎬ ⋅ − −⎩ ⎭
N
N N N C N N N t
t t t t t t
SS l S S I S
as Le t
αα α αψ δ   (10) 
Self-productivity ( 2
1
0
k
k
S
S
∂ >∂ ) for cognitive skills implies: 
( 1/ )(1/ ) 1 (1/ )
1 1 1 1 1
1
11 3 ( ) 0
( )
−− − +
− − − − −
−
∂ = + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + − >∂ + ⋅ −
C
C C C C C Nt
t t t t tC
t
S l S I S S
S as as Le t
α α α αα αψ δ  (11) 
⇔ ( 1/ )(1/ ) 1 (1/ )1 1 1 1 1 11 3 ( ) ( )
−− − +
− − − − −+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + > + ⋅ −
C C C C C N
t t t t tl S I S S as as Le t
α α α αα αψ δ . 
Self-productivity for non-cognitive skills implies: 
( 1/ )(1/ ) 1 (1/ )
1 1 1 1 1
1
11 3 ( ) 0
( )
−− − +
− − − − −
−
∂ = + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + − >∂ + ⋅ −
N
N N N N C Nt
t t t t tN
t
S l S I S S
S as as Le t
α α α αα αψ δ . (12) 
For equation (11) the term ( 1/ )(1/ ) 1 (1/ )1 1 1 1 13 ( )
−− − +
− − − − −⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + +C C C C C Nt t t t tl S I S Sα α α αα αψ δ  is always 
greater than zero. Thus, as long as 1
( )+ ⋅ −as as Le t  is greater than 1 across the whole 
life span, skill formation can be characterised by self-productivity. This is satisfied 
for most values except for very small as and very large t. Even for t=80 self-
productivity will be satisfied as long as 1>as . In the simulation model, as will have 
a value of 5.85 (see below). Condition (11) is therefore always satisfied and (12) 
analogously.  
The degree of complementarities of skill l for the production of skill k is given by 
2
1 1
0
k
t
k l
t t
S
I S− −
∂ >∂ ∂ . By using equations (9) and (10) it follows: 
2 (1/ )
2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1
0
0
1 1( 1 ) 0
9 3 3 3
− +
− + − + − − −
− − −
− −
>>
⎛ ⎞∂ ⋅= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ⎝ ⎠ ??????????????????????????????
C C C N
C C C Nt t t t
t t tC N
t t
S I S SI l S
I S
αα α α
α α δψ α δα (13) 
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It is easy to show that (13) is always true as long as 1α < , hence as long as there is 
no full substitutionality. The first part cannot be negative as long as the learning 
multiplier, investments and the level of skills are positive. For 1 0α> >  the second 
part contains two positive factors being multiplied. For 0α <  two negative factors 
multiply to a positive product. Thus, the product cannot turn negative. Vice versa the 
same is true for
2
1 1
N
t
N C
t t
S
I S− −
∂
∂ ∂  since the only difference of equation (10) compared to (9) 
are the terms Nψ and Ntl 1−  which are always greater than zero just like Cψ and Ctl 1−  . 
3.4 Achievement Scores and Human Capital 
The achievement an individual can reach in performing a task is a result of her cog-
nitive and self-regulatory skills. The two skills are both necessary and they may, in 
fact in rather complex ways, interact for measured achievement tests. A person with 
a high level of cognitive skills may produce low results if she has only low motiva-
tion for participation. Thus, student achievement tests like PISA (“Programme for 
International Student Assessment”) at the age of 16, IGLU (“Internationale Grund-
schule Lese-Untersuchung”) at the age of 10 or DESI (“Deutsch Englisch Schüler-
leistungen International”) measure the interaction of both cognitive and non-
cognitive skills. Several test procedures measure student performance in reading, 
mathematics or natural sciences (see for instance Weinert et al. (2006)). As a rule, 
the results of these different test scores have a correlation of approximately 70 per-
cent (see for instance DIPF (2006)) which may result, for instance, from individually 
comparable levels of self-regulatory skills. In our model, the achievement score, tA , 
is “produced” in each period by a Cobb Douglas function with equal weights of 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills: 
 
C N
t A t tA S S= ψ ⋅ ⋅           (14) 
 
The factor ψA  is an adjustment factor for different levels of normalization of 
achievement scores and their distributions. The PISA test score will be given by 16A  
and IGLU by 10A . Human capital in a given year is modelled as a function of cogni-
tive and self-regulatory skills and of the stock of human capital available from the 
previous year taking into account that human capital may depreciate, for example 
due to technological progress. Hence,  
 
H
tt
H
qtt ondepreciatiHonaccumulatiH 11 −−− −+=       (15) 
 
Various skills are necessary for the accumulation of human capital. A higher level of 
cognitive skills is as important as high levels of self-regulatory skills, of persistence 
and of self-regulation. The cumulative nature of human capital is modelled in a sim-
ple way. The third factor in the accumulation process is the available stock of human 
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capital from the previous period. For reasons of simplicity we assume a Cobb Doug-
las production function for the accumulation process where each of the three factors 
has the same elasticity. The sum of the elasticities may vary with the parameter 
γ and we will investigate the consequences for the distribution of the returns to edu-
cation from varying gammas below. For high values of γ , large differences in skills 
will enhance differences in human capital. A small γ , on the other side, will lead to 
a smaller variation of human capital. For 0γ = , human capital is the same for all skill 
levels. 
Thus, 
 
1 1 1
3 3 3
γ⋅ γ⋅ γ⋅⎛ ⎞= ψ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
H C N
t H t t taccumulation S S H .      (16) 
 
The dimension of human capital is the EURO. This may be interpreted in a way that 
individuals get paid exactly according to the value of their human capital. Let Hψ  be 
the adjustment factor transforming skills and the stock of human capital into EU-
ROs. Furthermore, a function is needed for the depreciation of human capital across 
the life span. Let Htv  be the number of periods needed until an individual will loose 
all its human capital completely given that no new investment in skills takes place. 
Since human capital depreciation accelerates as people become older it follows that:  
 
( )= ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ −H H Ht tv v as Le tϑ ϑ         (17) 
 
Hϑ is the depreciation factor which may vary between individuals, jobs, industry and 
over time. For example, a higher Hϑ will lead to an earlier human capital maximum 
in a job or an industry, a lower Hϑ  to a maximum later on. For some activities like 
soccer the maximum is reached early in life, but for others like philosophers the 
maximum may be reached later in life. Thus, 
H
t
tH
t v
H
ondepreciati = .         (18) 
 
Inserting (17) in (18) and (18) together with (16) in (15), the full human capital 
equation is: 
 
1 1 1
13 3 3
1 1 1 1 ( 1)
γ⋅ γ⋅ γ⋅ −
− − − −
⎛ ⎞= ψ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + −⎜ ⎟ ϑ ⋅ ⋅ − +⎝ ⎠
C N t
t H t t t t H
HH S S H H
as Le t
    (19) 
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4. Creating Heterogeneity in Skill Formation  
4.1. The “Standard” Individual  
The cognitive and self-regulatory skills of a standard individual are the result of 
equations (9) and (10) which interact for 80 periods. ψk with k=C, N is adjusted so 
that the level of cognitive skills at the age of 20 is 20 600=CS  for all types of comple-
mentarities. A standard individual is furthermore defined with 0α = . In this case, the 
CES function collapses to a Cobb Douglas production function for skills. Following 
results of Kaufman et al. (1996) (for more details see chapter 2 above) the adjusted 
mean of the fluid problem solving score of a 65 year old is equal to 87 percent of the 
adjusted mean for 20 year old individuals, which is equal to C20S  (or 600).   
 
as is adjusted in  way such that the value for  C65S  in equation (9) is 87 percent of the 
value for C20S . It turned out that this is the case for as=5.85. For a newborn, the size 
of the brain is equal to about 25 to 30 percent of the brain value at young adult age. 
We assume 0CS  to be 30 percent of 20CS , hence we set 0 180=CS . Furthermore, each 
year the standard individual will invest one unit in both skills during its whole life 
which implies that 1=ktI . For the standard individual the level of cognitive skills 
over the life cycle is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Cognitive skills from age 0 to 80 (normalized between 0 and 600) 
 
The figure replicates nicely psychological findings on the development of cognitive 
skills and intelligence across the life span ((Kaufmann et al. (1996), Courchese et al. 
(2000)). With those values, self-regulatory (non-cognitive) skills will peak at mid 
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age matching the results in chapter 2.2. For the standard individual the level of self-
regulatory skills over the life cycle is illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Self-regulatory (non-cognitive) skills from age 0 to 80 
(normalized between 0 and 600) 
 
The figure replicates some findings on the development of self-regulatory skills and 
social integration across the life span (see chapter 2 above). After an adjustment of 
Aψ  in (14) such that 16A  equals 507.77 (the PISA reading test value in Germany for 
the 50th percentile (OECD (2000)), the achievement performance over the life cycle 
from equation (14) is illustrated in Figure 5. Achievement is influenced by both 
cognitive and self-regulatory skills and reaches its maximum around mid age. It cap-
tures the compensation of declining cognitive skills on the one hand and the effect 
that rising self-regulatory (non-cognitive) skills might have during mid adult age, the 
time when individuals are engaged in the labour market to create wages and addi-
tional human capital, on the other side. 
 
The average annual wage of a worker in industries in Germany is 29,787 Euros (Sta-
tistical Yearbook Germany 2006). If we assume that an individual works from pe-
riod 18 to period 65 her lifetime earnings will be around 1,400,000 Euros. ψH  in 
(19) is adjusted in a way so that this condition is satisfied. For standardization issues 
Hϑ  in (19) is always adjusted such that the human capital maximum is reached in 
t=55. Given theses adjustments the development of human capital across the life cy-
cle for the standard individual is illustrated in figure 6. For assessing the returns to 
investments in skills we will use the human capital accumulated over the life span. 
For this objective one needs to calculate the sum of properly discounted wages over 
some periods, here 18 to 65, discounted to the age of 18. Assuming a constant inter-
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est rate of 2 percent, the discounted lifetime income at period 18 of the standard in-
dividual is 821,274 €.  Educational policies will be evaluated with respect to 
changes in the discounted lifetime income at the age of 18. 
 
Figure 5: Achievement scores from age 0 to 80 (normalized to 500 at age 16) 
 
 
Figure 6: Annual human capital from age 0 to 80 (adjusted to 29,787 
Euros at the age of 40) 
 
4.2. Dimensions of Essential Heterogeneity in Skill Formation 
Four dimensions of essential heterogeneity in the technology of skills and the forma-
tion of skills and human capital over the life cycle and their consequences for the 
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distribution of returns to education are modelled. They are rooted in the biological, 
psychological and socioeconomic nature of learning and skill formation.  
 
The first dimension of essential heterogeneity is related to the age at which an in-
vestment in skills will be made. It results from the biological foundations of how 
human beings learn and develop skills and has already been discussed in detail 
above. A constant, for all individuals equal amount of investment in skills will pro-
duce age-specific decreasing returns to skills. For skill formation it therefore really 
matters at what age investments take place. From traditional human capital models, 
it is well-known that the shorter the time period until retirement the lower the incen-
tive to invest in skills. The period which is left for harvesting is relevant. However, 
the dimension of heterogeneity which is introduced here is related to the age specific 
learning multipliers Ctl  and Ntl  originating from findings from neurobiology and psy-
chology research on child development.  
 
The second dimension of heterogeneity is a result of differences in individual learn-
ing capacities. In our interpretation this dimension of heterogeneity can best be re-
lated to individual differences in genetic endowments. Formally, individual gifted-
ness is a variation of δ  in equation (9) and (10). It is the way in which individuals 
transform a given, identical input into new skills. In this dimension we will once 
more assume that this type of heterogeneity remains constant across the life cycle. It 
will change the ability of skill acquisition and lead to different values for 16A  equal-
ling the PISA test scores in Table 2 and human capital with ceteris paribus identical 
amounts of investments.  
 
In a variant, we model differences in the amount of cognitive and self-regulatory 
skills at the time when individuals are born. Prenatal conditions may matter for skill 
formation later on in life. A related literature investigates the determinants and con-
sequences of birth weight. Black et al. (2005) for example find a significant impact 
of low birth weight on the IQ, education and earnings success of children. In the 
simulation model, differences in in utero conditions can be captured by C0S  and N0S . 
For simplicity reasons we model a symmetric variation of cognitive and self-
regulatory skills. The two ways of modelling distinctions in genetic endowments 
differ, but in our model the consequences are rather similar.  
 
The third dimension of essential heterogeneity is the degree of complementarities 
between cognitive and self-regulatory skills in the skill formation process, α . α  
may be the result of individual differences in genetic endowments, as well as spe-
cific investments of parents or schools.  
  
The fourth dimension of heterogeneity is the amount of investments in skills from 
the family or the social environment ( CtI , NtI  ). In the model, each family or social 
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environment provides the individual with a different, symmetric and annually con-
stant investment in cognitive and self-regulatory skills from period 0 to 80. Indi-
viduals living in an unfavourable environment constantly receive low investments 
corresponding to lower educational and labour market outcomes. Individuals living 
in favourable environments, on the other side, profit from higher skill investments 
throughout their lives leading to higher educational and labour market outcomes. In 
one variant of the model, the investment impulse will last only until the age of 18; 
for the rest of the life span, the impulse is again constant for all individuals. In a 
second variant of the model, we compare the consequences for the distribution of the 
returns to education for investments in self-regulatory skills ( NtI ).  
 
The fourth dimension of essential heterogeneity is related to the amount of educa-
tional investments an individual receives. Families may differ with respect to their 
size and stability, the amount of cognitive and self-regulatory skills of the parents 
and other family members, and their human capital. Influences from the environ-
ment stem from the neighbourhood, the quality of schools or the infrastructure in the 
region where the children grow up. There exists a rich economic and sociological 
literature contributing to the relevance of these environmental factors for the indi-
vidual development of skills. In our model, altering the amount of investments in the 
skills of children is the way a society may try to influence the distribution of skills 
and human capital and compensate for environmental disadvantages.  
 
Recently, the distributions of achievement scores for 16 year old students in reading, 
mathematics and natural sciences have received a great deal of attention. Achieve-
ment scores can best be understood as a function of cognitive and self-regulatory 
skills. For the purpose of calibrating our simulation model we use the PISA 2000 
(OECD (2000)) reading test scores for German students from different types of 
schools, see Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Percentiles of PISA reading test scores for Germany 
 
 PISA reading score/ 16A  
1 % 236.57 
10 % 362.7 
25 % 438.95 
50 % 507.77 
75 % 568.64 
90 % 619.8 
99 % 707.23 
Source: PISA 2000, OECD, own calculations. 
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In different simulation models, the parameters of essential heterogeneity in the two 
basic skill production functions are chosen such that they generate the PISA distri-
bution according to equation 14 at the age of sixteen. After dropping the duplicates 
4,432 unique observations remained. From these observations we derive seven per-
centiles for the scores of reading performance (see Table 2). That way a heterogene-
ous population in achievement scores at the age of sixteen consisting of seven indi-
viduals is modelled. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the parameter variations causing the PISA distribution on the 
basis of equation 14. 
 
Table 3: The PISA distribution for different types of heterogeneity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For instance, a student at the 99th percentile in the PISA test receives ceteris paribus 
skill investments that are 2.7684 times higher than those of the 50th percentile, de-
fined as the “standard individual” (column 2). The individual learning ability of a 
student at the 99th percentile will be, ceteris paribus, 1.40414 times as high as the 
one of the standard individual (column 3). The starting values of skills at the time of 
birth of a student at the 99th percentile will be, ceteris paribus, 284.62, compared to 
180 of the standard individual (column 4).  
 
The simulation of human capital over the life cycle is based on equation (19). Figure 
7 illustrates the level of cognitive and self-regulatory skills, achievement and human 
capital for a population of heterogeneous skill investments during childhood on an 
annual basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Percentile Variation of 
k k
0 80I ...I  
Variation of δ  Variation of  
C
0S ; 
N
0S  
1 % 0.01467 0.24478 57.613 
10 % 0.2611 0.63915 110.747 
25 % 0.5884 0.838 146.27 
50 % 1 1 180 
75 % 1.452 1.13238 210.945 
90 % 1.8929 1.23701 237.66 
99 % 2.7684 1.40414 284.62 
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Figure 7: A population of seven individuals with heterogeneous environments 
 
 
 
Next, we turn our attention to the synergetic nature of skill formation, modelled by 
variations of the degrees of complementarities. Our approach is an empirical one. To 
test the validity of several complementarities we run simulations for different values 
of α . In all variants of the model an adjustment of ψk  for k=C, N guarantees that 
20 600
kS =  for all complementarities. This adjustment is necessary since different val-
ues for α  cause large numerical differences in the CES production function 
k
tlearning , but leave ktlosing  basically unchanged.  
 
Table 4 contains the implied variations of ktI  for different values of α  in (9) and (10) 
such that the achievement scores modelled in equation (14) replicate the PISA 
achievement reading scores. Table 5 contains the implied variations of C0S  and N0S , 
the skills at birth, for different values of α  such that the achievement scores repli-
cate the PISA reading scores. Recall that 1α =  leads to complete skill substitutional-
ity, 0α =  to the Cobb Douglas case with an elasticity of substitution of 1 and α = −∞  
to full complementarity. 
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Table 4: Parameter variations causing the PISA distribution 
for different environments 
 
Variation of ktI  
Percentile 100α = −  0.3α = −  0α =  0.3α =  1α =  
1 % 0.2 0.14 0.01467 - - 
10 % 0.56 0.512 0.2611 - - 
25 % 0.79 0.763 0.5884 0.004 - 
50 % 1 1 1 1 1 
75 % 1.183 1.215 1.452 4.8 392 
90 % 1.338 1.4 1.8929 11 724 
99 % 1.605 1.725 2.7684 28.3 1,300 
 
Table 5: Parameter variations causing the PISA distribution 
for different starting conditions 
 
Symmetric variation of C0S  and 
N
0S  
Percentile 100α = −  0.3α = −  0α =  0.3α =  1α =  
1 % - 7.3 57.613 79.6 83.7 
10 % 33 71 110.747 125.9 128.5 
25 % 110 125.7 146.27 154.25 155.3 
50 % 180 180 180 180 180 
75 % 242 230 210.945 203 201.5 
90 % 294 274 237.66 222 219.5 
99 % 384 351 284.62 255.4 251 
 
In the case of high complementarity with 100α = − , starting values vary between 384 
and 0 to bring out the PISA distribution at the age of 16 (Table 5). The variation of 
the starting conditions becomes smaller with a lower α . With 1α = , starting values 
vary between 251 and 83.7 to generate the PISA distribution. Heterogeneity is even 
more sensitive to variations of the environment for different values of complemen-
tarities (see Table 4). With 1α = , for instance, the 99 percent student must receive an 
amount of investment 1,300 times as large as the one for 50 99 percent students. By 
assuming high skill complementarities, inequality at birth can thus more easily be 
compensated by later skill investment. In the case of a high degree of complemen-
tarities, skill investments throughout the life span play a more crucial role compared 
to in utero conditions. 
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For the case of 0α = , both starting conditions and skill investments in childhood 
have a significant effect. Students at the 1st percentile of the PISA distribution with 
average starting conditions will receive almost no skill investment while students of 
the 99th percentile with average starting conditions receive a skill investment which 
is 2.7684 times larger than investments for the 50th percentile. Finally, considering 
full substitutionality with 1α =  there is no bottleneck in the production of skills, thus 
favourable starting conditions alone will bring the individual almost to an average 
skill level even if no further investments are undertaken. Starting conditions deter-
mine the skill development throughout life and investments during childhood barely 
have any influence. 
 
From our point of view, the results indicate that the Cobb Douglas case ( 0α = ) is a 
reasonable model of the synergetic nature of learning with multiple inputs in the 
case of Germany. It seems to already capture some aspects of the trade off in the 
technology of skill formation between skill investments throughout childhood and 
starting conditions. With the extreme values of α , the results are less convincing. 
Therefore, in the following we will proceed with the assumption 0α = . 
4.3. Mobility and the Heterogeneity of Labour Markets  
The inequality of skills will be transformed in wage and earnings inequality as well. 
In addition to that, mobility between jobs, occupations, firms and regions is crucial 
for the matching of supply and demand and for wage determination. Furthermore, 
these processes are influenced by differences in labour regulation, wage determina-
tion and the social transfer system. For instance, the inequality of wages may be re-
stricted by minimum wages or social transfers for those who are not employed or by 
collective wage bargaining. To adjust our simulation results to the German labour 
market we use the 90-10 ratio of inequality in earnings which is approximately equal 
to 3 (Gernandt und Pfeiffer (2006), OECD (2006a)). By an adjustment of γ  and ψH  
in (19) the model can be calibrated to any empirical wage distributions. After the 
adjustment, the accumulated income of the 90th percentile in period 65 is 3 times 
larger than the accumulated income of the 10th percentile. Thus, inequality in human 
capital is a result of the inequality of skills and of differences in labour markets.  
 
It turns out that inequality arising through the labour market equals the measured 
wage inequality in Germany for 1.58γ = . When 0γ =  there is no wage inequality at 
all even in the case when educational levels differ substantially. Figure 8 illustrates 
these adjustments. It is obvious that labour market characteristics determine the re-
turns to education in our simulation model. In our model, the returns to education 
are the higher the greater the inequality of wages will be. This result seems to be in 
line with recent findings on rising returns to education in Germany and other indus-
trialized countries (see for instance Gebel and Pfeiffer (2007)). If there was no wage 
or income inequality nobody would gain from more education. 
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Figure 8: Simulations of labour market inequality 
 
5. Simulation Results 
5.1. Returns to Symmetric Investments in Skills 
This chapter discusses the simulation results for the returns to education at different 
ages during childhood and young adult age. It is assumed that the seven individuals 
of our heterogeneous population work from the age of 18 until the age of 65 while 
accumulating earnings. The amount of human capital of each individual is defined 
as the present value of the sum of annual earnings evaluated at age of 18. The inter-
est rate is assumed to be 2 percent. Individual returns to education will be measured 
by the percentage change of the present value of the accumulated lifetime income in 
period 18 due to additional age-dependent educational impulses.  
 
Two sources of essential heterogeneity introduced in part 4.2 are investigated: ine-
quality of skills as a consequence of inequality from the environment and of ine-
qualities in individual giftedness in learning. Given these two dimensions of hetero-
geneity together with the age-dependent variations of the learning multipliers, we 
assess the distribution of the returns to education for different educational policies. 
In this part, we model four different types of educational investments. The first one 
is called the preschool impulse which provides an additional constant skill invest-
ment lasting six years from the age of 0 until 5. The second one is a primary school 
impulse which lasts from period 6 to 11. The third one is a secondary school impulse 
from period 12 to 17 and the fourth one is a tertiary educational impulse lasting form 
Human capital
80,000 € 
60,000 € 
40,000 € 
20,000 € 
0 € 
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 64 72 
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18 to 21. The tertiary educational impulse is specific in the sense that individuals 
have to sacrifice four years of income in order to attend this education. If a person 
chooses to attend a tertiary education she will only receive earnings from period 22 
to 65. 
 
Furthermore, individuals will receive an additional, symmetric skill investment of 
k
tI 5,k c,n= =  in both cognitive and regulatory (non-cognitive) skills. The EURO cost 
of an annual investment impulse is given by 5,627 € which is equal to the estimated 
average of educational investments per student in Germany in the year 2005 (OECD 
(2006b)). In our model, we assume that an individual has to pay 5,627 € per annum 
for this additional educational impulse. Table 6 shows the total gains in human capi-
tal measured in EUROS for each of the seven individuals whose heterogeneity stems 
from different environments (variations of k k0 80I ...I ). Table 7 shows the corresponding 
distributions of individual returns to education. 
 
Table 6: Returns to education in monetary units for the percentiles in 
heterogeneous societies (discounted to period 18) 
 
Percentile Impulse  
k
0I  to 
k
5I  
Impulse  
k
6I  to 
k
11I  
Impulse 
k
12I  to 
k
17I  
Impulse 
k
18I  to 
k
21I  
1 % 449 652 € 224 646 € 38 540 € -4 336 € 
10 % 618 398 € 355 002 € 91 729 € 8 966 € 
25 % 704 126 € 424 170 € 121 686 € 15 668 € 
50 % 773 887 € 481 201 € 146 909 € 20 597 € 
75 % 831 012 € 528 106 € 167 854 € 24 065 € 
90 % 876 492 € 565 456 € 184 584 € 26 345 € 
99 % 950 252 € 625 836 € 211 614 € 29 005 € 
 
The numbers indicate that the earlier in childhood a skill investment is provided the 
higher the return for the individual, both measured in absolute values as well as in 
returns to education. One reason for early investments in skills having a greater 
benefit over the life cycle is due to the fact that the learning multiplier ktl  is higher in 
young age. More important, however, is the cumulative nature of skill formation due 
to self-productivity and direct complementarities. These basic learning characteris-
tics make childhood and very early childhood crucial for the formation of human 
capital.  
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Table 7: Individual returns to education for the percentiles in 
heterogeneous societies 
 
Percentile Impulse  
k
0I  to 
k
5I  
Impulse  
k
6I  to 
k
11I  
Impulse 
k
12I  to 
k
17I  
Impulse 
k
18I  to 
k
21I  
1 % 27.74% 17.79% 4.29% -0.82% 
10 % 17.87% 11.92% 3.78% 0.60% 
25 % 14.17% 9.59% 3.23% 0.67% 
50 % 11.70% 7.99% 2.78% 0.62% 
75 % 10.00% 6.88% 2.44% 0.55% 
90 % 8.83% 6.10% 2.20% 0.49% 
99 % 7.26% 5.06% 1.85% 0.40% 
 
Individuals from more disadvantaged environments receive lower absolute incre-
ments of human capital even though their (relative) returns are always higher. Those 
starting with a relatively low skill level will profit less from an additional investment 
impulse in terms of additional absolute monetary earnings (cp. table 6). So it follows 
that if society is interested in maximizing the total amount of human capital, addi-
tional scarce resources should ideally be invested in children from bright environ-
ments. However, the relative gains (the additional earnings in percent of actual earn-
ings) are significantly higher for individuals from disadvantaged environments (cp. 
table 7). This has two reasons. First, individuals from disadvantaged environments 
start with lower levels of investments and skills. Therefore, self-productivity and 
direct complementarities start with lower inputs leading to lower long run returns. 
And second, the marginal rate of return to additional investments is decreasing in the 
CES production function. Individuals with a higher skill level will benefit relatively 
less from an additional skill investment. Both effects together surpass the positive 
effect of skill complementary on individual rates of return. Thus, if society is inter-
ested in maximizing the relative gains in earnings and human capital, it follows that 
additional scarce resources should ideally be invested in children from disadvan-
taged environments. 
 
With age increasing, the costs of education become higher than the benefits. Thus, 
for a tertiary educational investment not the 1st, but the 25th percentile receives the 
highest individual returns. This is due to the fact that the 1st percentile has a benefit 
smaller than the costs and thus has a negative return to tertiary education. The 25th 
percentile, on the other side, has the highest individual educational return in this 
scenario because not only is the benefit significantly higher than the cost of educa-
tion, but also is the level of skills still small enough to generate a high individual 
rate of return. 
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Table 8 illustrates the individual returns to education for the second scenario where 
heterogeneity is caused by a variation of k k0 18I ...I (different families). In a variant of the 
standard model of heterogeneous environments all individuals older than 18 receive 
the same skill investment of 1 until the rest of their lives. Thus, from period 18 on 
the marginal rate of skill production will not be smaller for the high percentiles 
compared to the first scenario with heterogeneous societies, but the individual rate 
of return to tertiary education changes as can be seen by comparing table 8 to table 
7. Due to skill complementarities, people with a higher skill level benefit slightly 
more from an impulse even though higher percentiles still have a significantly high 
level of skills. 
 
Table 8: Individual returns to education for the percentiles for 
heterogeneous families 
 
Percentile Impulse  
k
0I  to 
k
5I  
Impulse  
k
6I  to 
k
11I  
Impulse 
k
12I  to 
k
17I  
Impulse 
k
18I  to 
k
21I  
1 % 27.59% 18.09% 4.81% -1.79% 
10 % 17.78% 11.94% 3.83% 0.04% 
25 % 14.13% 9.58% 3.23% 0.42% 
50 % 11.70% 7.99% 2.78% 0.62% 
75 % 10.02% 6.88% 2.45% 0.73% 
90 % 8.87% 6.12% 2.21% 0.79% 
99 % 7.32% 5.08% 1.87% 0.86% 
 
The differences in the returns to education in tables 7 and 8 illustrate the importance 
of the decreasing marginal rate of return in the skill production function and of the 
small skill multiplier in adult age.  
 
Tables 9 and 10 contain the results for the case when individuals differ, ceteris pari-
bus, with respect to their ability of transforming a given educational input into new 
skills, δ . This implies that individuals do not differ with respect to their environ-
ment. Decreasing marginal rates of education do not play a role in this scenario 
since the population of the seven individuals receives absolutely identical amounts 
of inputs from their environment. Now our findings for the returns to age-dependent 
education differ dramatically from the previous ones.  
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Table 9: Returns to education in monetary units for the percentiles for 
heterogeneous giftedness (discounted to period 18) 
 
Percentile Impulse  
k
0I  to 
k
5I  
Impulse  
k
6I  to 
k
11I  
Impulse 
k
12I  to 
k
17I  
Impulse 
k
18I  to 
k
21I  
1 % -8 612 € -17 014 € -27 574 € -23 681 € 
10 % 204 569 € 118 570 € 20 716 € -12 774 € 
25 % 453 737 € 277 156 € 76 232 € 1 572 € 
50 % 773 887 € 481 201 € 146 909 € 20 597 € 
75 % 1 141 632 € 715 916 € 227 574 € 42 785 € 
90 % 1 517 412 € 956 106 € 309 634 € 65 645 € 
99 % 2 312 452 € 1 465 226 € 482 454 € 114 315 € 
 
 
Table 10: Individual returns to education for the percentiles 
for heterogeneous giftedness 
 
Percentile Impulse  
k
0I  to 
k
5I  
Impulse  
k
6I  to 
k
11I  
Impulse 
k
12I  to 
k
17I  
Impulse 
k
18I  to 
k
21I  
1 % -1.10% -2.23% -3.75% -4.73% 
10 % 7.65% 4.77% 0.92% -0.88% 
25 % 10.12% 6.73% 2.08% 0.07% 
50 % 11.70% 7.99% 2.78% 0.62% 
75 % 12.80% 8.86% 3.25% 0.98% 
90 % 13.57% 9.48% 3.56% 1.22% 
99 % 14.66% 10.36% 4.00% 1.54% 
 
 
The absolute and relative returns to education increase with giftedness. An invest-
ment in education has the highest returns for gifted individuals’ and returns become 
lower or even negative for the others. Thus, differences in individual giftedness have 
a higher impact on inequality than differences stemming from the environment. This 
is a result of the basic properties of the technology of skill formation, self-
productivity and direct complementarities. Obviously, these findings have important 
policy implications. If the source of heterogeneity is varying it follows that individ-
ual abilities to transform educational inputs into new additional skills need more re-
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sources to be successful instead of compensating policies for environmental differ-
ences directed for instance to equity goals.  
 
To summarize our findings so far: If our society of seven individuals wants to 
maximize the sum of the additional human capital formed by limited additional re-
sources for investments in education, the best strategy is to either invest in students 
from a bright environment or with bright learning abilities. If the goal is the maxi-
mization of the relative returns to each individual, limited resources for additional 
educational investments should first be directed to the most disadvantaged in a 
world where the reason of heterogeneity is the environment. If heterogeneity stems 
form individual giftedness investments should again first be directed to the most 
gifted individuals. 
5.2. Returns to Asymmetric Investments in Skills 
It is possible that investments in skills are not symmetric. Therefore, we now assume 
that educational institutions can direct investments to enhance either cognitive or 
self-regulatory skills. Of course, due to the synergetic nature of learning, specific 
investments to foster one type of skills will indirectly also foster the other skills de-
pending on the degree of complementarities. Knowledge about the most successful 
investment strategies for the different stages of childhood and adolescence is crucial 
for fostering human capital.   
 
In the simulation model, an asymmetric skill investment of ktI 10=  is introduced into 
either cognitive or self-regulatory skills. Thus, the size of the skill investment is 
equal to the one of the previous chapter. We investigate the returns to education (cp. 
table 11 and 12) for a world where heterogeneity is caused by a variation in the envi-
ronment ( k k0 80I ...I ). A striking result is that investments in cognitive skills in early 
childhood will have the highest long run impacts (table 11). In adolescence and 
young adult age, however, self-regulatory skill investments become the preferred 
type of investments (table 12). This result obviously depends on the relative magni-
tudes of the learning multipliers defined earlier together with the cumulative and 
synergetic nature of the technology of skill formation in our model. The self-
regulatory learning multiplier was assumed to be lower than the cognitive multiplier 
before the age of 12 and higher afterwards. 
  
By comparing the asymmetric skill impulse into cognitive skills (table 11) with the 
symmetric impulse (table 7) it can be seen that the symmetric impulse is always su-
perior in early childhood which nicely illustrates the synergetic nature of skill for-
mation. Lower levels of self-regulatory skills in early childhood weaken the strength 
of skill investments in later life due to skill complementarities, thus reducing the re-
turns to education. For children from a bright environment the difference is small, 
but for children from disadvantaged environments the difference is larger. Espe-
cially for these children a mixed strategy therefore seems to be preferable. 
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Table 11: Individual returns to education for a cognitive impulse 
(heterogeneous environment) 
 
Percentile Impulse  
k
0I  to 
k
5I  
Impulse  
k
6I  to 
k
11I  
Impulse 
k
12I  to 
k
17I  
Impulse 
k
18I  to 
k
21I  
1 % 18.41% 10.95% -0.90% -4.62% 
10 % 13.95% 8.88% 0.91% -1.74% 
25 % 11.81% 7.68% 1.08% -1.16% 
50 % 10.23% 6.75% 1.10% -0.88% 
75 % 9.07% 6.05% 1.06% -0.71% 
90 % 8.23% 5.53% 1.02% -0.62% 
99 % 7.03% 4.78% 0.93% -0.51% 
 
 
By comparing the asymmetric self-regulatory skill impulse (table 12) with the sym-
metric skill impulse (table 7) it is obvious that there are periods where an asymmet-
ric skill investment is superior. For children from a bright environment an asymmet-
ric skill investment is superior for investments in secondary and tertiary education. 
For the others it is only superior for tertiary education. Children from a bright envi-
ronment already receive enough cognitive skills and thus profit relatively more from 
an asymmetric impulse compared to a symmetric one. In young adult age, the re-
turns to cognitive skill investment are already relatively low (in our model of skill 
formation). 
 
Table 12: Individual returns to education for a self-regulatory impulse 
(heterogeneous societies) 
 
Percentile Impulse  
k
0I  to 
k
5I  
Impulse  
k
6I  to 
k
11I  
Impulse 
k
12I  to 
k
17I  
Impulse 
k
18I  to 
k
21I  
1 % 8.13% 5.05% 2.23% -0.32% 
10 % 7.17% 5.01% 2.98% 1.16% 
25 % 6.30% 4.49% 2.77% 1.21% 
50 % 5.58% 4.01% 2.52% 1.15% 
75 % 5.02% 3.63% 2.30% 1.06% 
90 % 4.60% 3.34% 2.13% 0.98% 
99 % 4.00% 2.91% 1.86% 0.84% 
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To summarize our findings so far: A reasonable strategy for fostering human capital 
is to supply children with symmetric impulses in cognitive and self-regulatory skills 
until adolescence. In adult age more investments should be directed to improve self-
regulatory skills. 
5.3. Individual Giftedness and Social Environment 
Hitherto, it was shown how the distribution of returns to education will depend on 
giftedness or the environment. This part investigates the consequences for returns to 
primary education with both factors of essential heterogeneity while also consider-
ing some aspects of the individual decision whether to attend tertiary education. We 
model a population where 50 percent of the heterogeneity of skills is explained by 
different environments and 50 percent by giftedness for example through genetic 
endowments (some authors argue that genetic endowment is responsible for 50 per-
cent of the variation in IQs, for instance Weinert (2001)).  
 
Both factors together cause an individual to belong to a specific percentile of the 
skills distribution. The population consists of 49 heterogeneous individuals reflect-
ing all possible combinations of environmental and giftedness variations. Table 13 
and 14 depict the absolute monetary as well as the individual relative returns to edu-
cation of the primary school impulse for this population. The highest returns meas-
ured in absolute monetary units are achieved by the most gifted individuals who re-
ceived the highest education in their social environment. However, the highest indi-
vidual returns to an educational impulse are achieved by individuals with a high 
giftedness coming from disadvantaged environments. 
 
Table 13: Monetary returns to education for heterogeneous giftedness and 
families, discounted to period 18 
 
  Giftedness 
Percentiles 1 % 10 % 25 % 50 % 75 % 90 % 99 % 
1 %  192 761 €  528 034 €  723 242 €  879 665 € 1 000 000 € 1 090 000 € 1 220 000 € 
10 %  212 571 €  628 308 €  878 758 € 1 080 000 € 1 240 000 € 1 360 000 € 1 540 000 € 
25 %  224 759 €  692 995 €  980 378 € 1 220 000 € 1 400 000 € 1 540 000 € 1 740 000 € 
50 %  235 924 €  754 169 € 1 080 000 € 1 340 000 € 1 550 000 € 1 710 000 € 1 950 000 € 
75 %  245 940 €  810 567 € 1 170 000 € 1 460 000 € 1 700 000 € 1 870 000 € 2 130 000 € 
90 %  254 462 €  859 642 € 1 250 000 € 1 570 000 € 1 820 000 € 2 010 000 € 2 300 000 € 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
99 %  269 261 €  947 191 € 1 390 000 € 1 760 000 € 2 050 000 € 2 270 000 € 2 600 000 € 
 
Next we investigate the decision of choosing the optimal duration of tertiary educa-
tion for the population of the 49 individuals, e.g. attending bachelor or master pro-
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grammes in a university. Individuals will maximize their returns to education con-
sidering the trade off between higher lifetime earnings caused by additional skill 
formation and its costs (foregone earnings, educational costs). Table 15 contains the 
optimal time of attending university which each individual from our population 
chooses. Two factors drive the decision of how long to attend university. First, 
gifted students will accumulate skills more easily starting already in early childhood 
and thus perceive a higher benefit from attending tertiary education.  
 
Table 14: Individual returns to education for heterogeneous giftedness and families 
  Giftedness 
Percentiles 1 % 10 % 25 % 50 % 75 % 90 % 99 % 
1 % 1.34% 8.75% 10.56% 11.60% 12.24% 12.67% 13.19% 
10 % 1.01% 7.37% 8.84% 9.64% 10.19% 10.54% 11.04% 
25 % 0.84% 6.68% 7.99% 8.80% 9.20% 9.51% 9.84% 
50 % 0.70% 6.13% 7.37% 7.94% 8.37% 8.73% 9.13% 
75 % 0.60% 5.70% 6.84% 7.37% 7.75% 8.04% 8.37% 
90 % 0.52% 5.37% 6.45% 6.98% 7.24% 7.44% 7.80% 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t  
99 % 0.40% 4.87% 5.81% 6.32% 6.59% 6.83% 7.06% 
 
Secondly, students from more favourable environments achieve higher gains from 
attending university. They tend to remain in university for a longer time even though 
facing the opportunity cost of not being able to work during this time. 
 
Table 15: Utility maximizing duration of tertiary education in years 
  Giftedness 
Percentiles 1 % 10 % 25 % 50 % 75 % 90 % 99 % 
1 % 0 0 1 2 3 4 4 
10 % 0 0 2 3 4 5 5 
25 % 0 1 2 4 4 5 5 
50 % 0 1 3 4 5 5 6 
75 % 0 1 3 4 5 5 6 
90 % 0 2 3 4 5 5 6 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
99 % 0 2 4 5 5 6 6 
 35
5.4. Life Expectancy and Returns to Education 
In this chapter we examine the possible influence of rising life expectancy and po-
tential working life duration observed in most industrial countries for the distribu-
tion of age-dependent returns to education. For that goal we assume that an individ-
ual’s earnings stream starts at the age of 18 and continues until death. Two scenarios 
are compared. In the first scenario individuals live 80 years and in the second they 
live 90 years. We assess the distribution of the returns to education for a preschool 
impulse, a primary impulse, a secondary and a tertiary impulse as in our previous 
analysis as well and for both life expectancies. Tables 16 and 17 contain the changes 
in the returns to education if life expectancy increases from 80 to 90 years while as-
suming that the heterogeneity of skills arises from the environment. 
 
Table 16: Change in returns to education in monetary units if life expectancy in-
creases from 80 to 90 years (heterogeneous families, discounted to period 18) 
 
Percentile Impulse  
k
0I  to 
k
5I  
Impulse  
k
6I  to 
k
11I  
Impulse 
k
12I  to 
k
17I  
Impulse 
k
18I  to 
k
21I  
1 % + 282 195 € + 161 569 € + 46 162 € + 7 530 € 
10 % +  335 462 € + 209 281 € + 69 445 € + 16 836 € 
25 % + 358 527 € + 231 127 € + 81 050 € + 23 997 € 
50 % + 375 771 € + 247 731 € + 90 161 € + 31 409 € 
75 % + 389 140 € + 260 620 € + 97 350 € + 38 690 € 
90 % + 399 390 € + 270 470 € + 102 850 € + 45 310 € 
99 % + 415 610 € + 285 840 € + 111 430 € + 57 720 € 
 
For each student of our population, higher life expectancy improves the returns to 
education. Not surprisingly, the absolute monetary returns to education increase the 
most the earlier additional investments takes place. Furthermore, due to skill com-
plementarities, early investments for students from bright environments will gener-
ate more human capital than for students from disadvantaged environments. How-
ever, table 17 reveals the opposite picture for individual relative returns to educa-
tion. These are the lower the brighter students already are. But the new finding is 
that these returns increase with age. So if it is not possible for whatever reasons to 
invest during early childhood, higher life expectancy seems to enhance the returns of 
tertiary education specifically for students from disadvantaged environments. The 
relative gains from tertiary instead of primary additional education seem to be the 
higher the longer life expectancy lasts.   
 
Now we assume that the reason for heterogeneous skills arises from giftedness. The 
simulation results in Table 18 indicate that in this dimension of heterogeneity abso-
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lute returns to education vary to a higher degree. The increase in human capital for 
disadvantaged students is quite low even for very early education while gifted stu-
dents receive an increase of 1,132,800 € if their life expectancy rises by ten years 
and if they receive a six year lasting additional preschool investment.  
 
Table17: Change in individual returns to education in percentage points if life ex-
pectancy increases from 80 to 90 years (heterogeneous families, 
discounted to period 18) 
 
Percentile Impulse  
k
0I  to 
k
5I  
Impulse  
k
6I  to 
k
11I  
Impulse 
k
12I  to 
k
17I  
Impulse 
k
18I  to 
k
21I  
1 % + 0.27% + 0.55% + 0.82% + 1.09% 
10 % + 0.15% + 0.29% + 0.38% + 0.55% 
25 % + 0.11% + 0.21% + 0.27% + 0.42% 
50 % + 0.09% + 0.17% + 0.20% + 0.35% 
75 % + 0.07% + 0.14% + 0.17% + 0.31% 
90 % + 0.06% + 0.12% + 0.14% + 0.29% 
99 % + 0.05% + 0.09% + 0.11% + 0.25% 
 
Table 18: Change in returns to education in monetary units if life expectancy in-
creases from 80 to 90 years, heterogeneous giftedness, discounted to period 18 
 
Percentile Impulse  
k
0I  to 
k
5I  
Impulse  
k
6I  to 
k
11I  
Impulse 
k
12I  to 
k
17I  
Impulse 
k
18I  to 
k
21I  
1 % + 14 657 € + 9 751 € + 3 776 € + 1 219 € 
10 % + 108 270 € + 71 547 € + 26 756 € + 9 356 € 
25 % + 223 628 € + 147 528 € + 54 316 € + 18 988 € 
50 % + 375 771 € + 247 731 € + 90 161 € + 31 409 € 
75 % + 553 720 € + 364 980 € + 131 680 € + 45 690 € 
90 % + 737 890 € + 486 420 € + 174 390 € + 60 290 € 
99 % +1 132 800 € + 747 130 € + 265 370 € + 91 200 € 
 
For individual returns to education table 19 reveals a different picture. These returns 
are the smaller the brighter students already are and they tend to increase with age 
for all students. So if it is not possible for whatever reason to invest additional re-
sources in early childhood, increased life expectancy leads to an higher returns to 
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tertiary education for low ability students as well. However, there is no difference in 
the rate of returns between early and later investments. 
 
Table 19: Change in individual returns to education in percentage points if life ex-
pectancy rises from 80 to 90 years (heterogeneous giftedness, 
discounted to period 18) 
 
Percentile Impulse  
k
0I  to 
k
5I  
Impulse  
k
6I  to 
k
11I  
Impulse 
k
12I  to 
k
17I  
Impulse 
k
18I  to 
k
21I  
1 % + 1.38% + 1.33% + 1.28% + 1.34% 
10 % + 0.35% + 0.40% + 0.44% + 0.59% 
25 % + 0.17% + 0.25% + 0.28% + 0.44% 
50 % + 0.09% + 0.17% + 0.20% + 0.35% 
75 % + 0.04% + 0.12% + 0.16% + 0.30% 
90 % + 0.00% + 0.09% + 0.13% + 0.27% 
99 % -0.04% + 0.05% + 0.10% + 0.23% 
 
5.5. Wage Inequality and Returns to Education 
In part 4.3., the effect of the labour market on human capital inequality was intro-
duced. In this chapter we consider the relationship between wage inequality and the 
returns to education which has been researched intensively in empirical work in re-
cent years (see for instance Autor et al. (2006), or Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2006) for 
Germany). We assume heterogeneous skills due to heterogeneous family environ-
ments and adjust wage inequality to the level of three different countries. Educa-
tional levels in these countries are calibrated to the German PISA 2000 reading re-
sults.  
 
The degree of inequalities in wages is caused by differences in labour markets and 
not by differences in skills. The first country has a 90-10 ratio of 1.89 and thus a 
relatively small wage inequality, the second country has a 90-10 ratio of 3 like in 
Germany and the third country a relatively high inequality in earnings with a 90-10 
ratio of 7 which is halfway between the United States of America and India, for in-
stance. Table 20 summarizes the discounted lifetime human capital for the 7 differ-
ent percentiles in each of the three countries. Note that the 90-10 ratios of the dis-
counted lifetime earnings differ slightly from the actual 90-10 ratios.  
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The numbers in table 20 illustrate the difference in human capital arising from the 
modelled labour market institutions given that the heterogeneity of skills is the same 
in each country.  
 
Table 20: Discounted lifetime earnings for countries differing in wage inequality 
 
Percentile Country 1: 
90-10 ratio: 1.89 
Country 2: 
90-10 ratio: 3 
Country 3: 
90-10 ratio: 7 
1 % 351,669 € 173,398 € 48,998 € 
10 % 574,307 € 411,957 € 229,699 € 
25 % 716,921 € 608,674 € 459,777 € 
50 % 850,153 € 821,275 € 782,304 € 
75 % 971,188 € 1,037,480 € 1,183,550 € 
90 % 1,075,090 € 1,239,980 € 1,622,730 € 
99 % 1,256,930 € 1,630,690 € 2,633,750 € 
 
Table 21: Individual rates of return for a preschool impulse with a 
duration of 6 years 
 
Percentile Country 1: 
90-10 ratio : 1.89 
Country 2: 
90-10 ratio : 3 
Country 3: 
90-10 ratio : 7 
1 % 14.65% 27.59% 54.27% 
10 % 9.52% 17.78% 33.91% 
25 % 7.58% 14.13% 26.66% 
50 % 6.26% 11.70% 21.89% 
75 % 5.35% 10.02% 18.66% 
90 % 4.73% 8.87% 16.45% 
99 % 3.88% 7.32% 13.50% 
 
Tables 21 and 22 contain the individual rates of return from the preschool impulse 
for the three countries and the returns from a tertiary school impulse, respectively. 
The major result that can be drawn from table 21 is that rising labour market ine-
quality increases the returns to education significantly. The incentive to invest in 
additional education rises when people plan to enter a labour market with a high 
skill premium. Table 22 shows that if labour market inequality is too small, no in-
centive persists to invest in a tertiary education in country 1. The additional gain in 
human capital from further skills is below the costs of education. 
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Table 22: Individual rates of return for a tertiary school impulse 
with a duration of 4 years 
 
Percentile Country 1: 
90-10 ratio : 1.89 
Country 2: 
90-10 ratio : 3 
Country 3: 
90-10 ratio : 7 
1 % -1.63% -1.79% -7.90% 
10 % -0.97% 0.04% 1.34% 
25 % -0.77% 0.42% 2.33% 
50 % -0.65% 0.62% 2.67% 
75 % -0.57% 0.73% 2.81% 
90 % -0.52% 0.79% 2.86% 
99 % -0.45% 0.86% 2.88% 
 
5.6. An Alternative Learning Multiplier for Self-regulatory Skills 
In this section we discuss findings from a model with a different self-regulatory skill 
learning multiplier. We now assume that infancy is more relevant for self-regulatory 
compared to cognitive skill development, see Figure 9 for the new learning multi-
plier N'tl . 
 
Figure 9: Alternative self-regulatory learning multiplier from age 0 to 30 
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The new pattern of self-regulatory skill development over the life cycle from this 
learning multiplier (put into equations (9) and (10)) for our standard individual is 
illustrated in figure 10. Using the new multiplier self-regulatory skills grow more 
rapidly during infancy and exceed the growth of cognitive until the age of about 10 
years. Cognitive skills surpass self-regulatory skills in late childhood and adoles-
cence until the age of about 35. In mid to old age the loss of cognitive skills is then 
compensated by self-regulatory skills as in our standard model (see e.g. chapter 
4.1.). This also results in a change of returns to education. Table 23 summarizes the 
individual returns to education if heterogeneity arises from different families. 
 
Figure 10: Cognitive skills (blue) and self-regulatory skills (red) from age 0 to 80 
 
Table 23: Individual returns to education in monetary units for the percentiles in 
heterogeneous families in the modified model (discounted to period 18) 
Percentile Impulse  
k
0I  to 
k
5I  
Impulse  
k
6I  to 
k
11I  
Impulse 
k
12I  to 
k
17I  
Impulse 
k
18I  to 
k
21I  
1 % 41.50% 9.41% 0.03% -3.44% 
10 % 27.16% 6.77% 0.78% -1.58% 
25 % 21.80% 5.60% 0.80% -1.16% 
50 % 18.17% 4.76% 0.76% -0.93% 
75 % 15.62% 4.15% 0.70% -0.79% 
90 % 13.88% 3.72% 0.66% -0.71% 
99 % 11.50% 3.12% 0.58% -0.61% 
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In comparison to the results from section one above a pre-school impulse gains sig-
nificant importance in term of higher returns to education for all individuals. Returns 
to tertiary education turn even into negative numbers due to the opportunity cost of 
education, the fact that individuals can only start working and winning money 4 
years later. If infancy dominates the formation of self-regulatory competences as 
well as of cognitive skills in the way discussed, investment into skills in adult life do 
not enhance human capital. This however doesn’t contradict the fact that tertiary 
education obviously yields returns. E.g. we do not model the effects of signalling or 
a dynamic labour market. Tertiary education may also be more important in the case 
of higher wage inequalities. What persists in both models is the fact that low percen-
tiles gain higher individual returns to education but smaller monetary returns. Also 
returns to education decrease with age. 
 
To sum up with the model modification the preschool impulse gains significant im-
portance relative to all later educational impulses. These results imply that if infancy 
is a critical period not only for cognitive skills, but also for self-regulatory skills, 
pre-school investments into skills are even more important. For children from disad-
vantaged environments for instance such additional pre-school investments are the 
only way to help them to enhance theirs level of skills and human capital. Even 
though self-regulatory skills can increase more easily in adult age than cognitive 
skills, reflecting the results described in chapter 2.2., an unfavourable environment 
in infancy decreases the stability of personality dramatically. 
 
6. Efficiency and Equity  
6.1 Inequality and the Welfare Function 
In this chapter we will use the Atkinson index and a welfare function for considering 
some aspects of the trade off between efficiency and equity in educational policies 
for the life cycle welfare of our population of seven individuals. We assume the 
standard model of life cycle skill formation as introduced in chapter 4. The Atkinson 
Index (Atkinson (1970)) is a discrete measure of inequality for an income distribu-
tion of a population with N individuals: 
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iy  symbolizes individual human capital accumulated over the life span, μ  the aver-
age human capital of the population and ε  is a parameter for indicating different de-
grees of equity preferences in the society. For 0ε = , a society does not care about 
equity at all. For ε = ∞ , the index only depends on the welfare of the poorest indi-
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vidual of the society. The Atkinson Index is normalized between 0 and 1. If 
( ) 0A Yε = , there exists no measured inequality in the distribution while ( ) 1A Yε =  indi-
cates maximum inequality. For empirical applications, equity considerations may 
vary between 0.5 2.5ε≤ ≤ (Atkinson (1970)). Based on this index, we employ the fol-
lowing welfare function for our population (Sen et al. (1997)): 
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We will use the Atkinson index (equation 20) and the welfare function (equation 21) 
for assessing the impact of various educational policies on the welfare of our popu-
lation of seven individuals for different values of ε . Educational policies are re-
stricted by exogenous scarcity and the welfare maximizing plan of the policy maker. 
Scarcity is modelled in a simple way. We assume that only 3 out of the 7 individuals 
of our population can receive an additional educational investment. Four different 
investment policies are available. Policy makers are interested in a comparison of 
additional preschool and tertiary investment in skills. Based on our simulation 
model, we assess the optimal allocation of educational investments for maximizing 
welfare. First we consider the case where heterogeneity in adult life arises from dif-
ferent family environments in childhood.  
 
Table 24 shows the amount of inequality measured by the Atkinson index for four 
different allocations, see column 1. As ε  rises, the index becomes more sensitive to 
inequality. Compensating policies defined as preschool investments for the most 
disadvantaged students reduce the Atkinson index for various values of ε . With ad-
ditional investments in skills during young adulthood, the Atkinson does not change 
that much. For equity reasons, educational investments should be directed to early 
childhood in a society where the heterogeneity of skills stems from the social envi-
ronment (see also Armor (2003), Cunha et al. (2006)). In general, additional educa-
tion for students from advantaged environments increases inequality.  
 
Table 25 shows the welfare resulting from the 4 different allocations. As ε  rises, 
inequality is perceived more critically and thus reduces welfare. On the other side, 
for 0ε =  inequality does not reduce welfare at all. Welfare is equal to the sum of the 
accumulated human capital of the members of the population. The tertiary impulse 
produces less welfare than the preschool impulse due to a much smaller learning 
multiplier in adult age and due to skill complementarities. Human capital accumula-
tion is maximized when the scarce resources are invested in students from advan-
taged environments. The more important equity considerations become in a society, 
the more compensating educational policies are required for welfare maximization 
(at least in the absence of social transfer policies which are discussed in the next sec-
tion of this chapter).  
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Table 24: Atkinson indices for different allocations of education 
(heterogeneous families) 
 
 0ε =  0.5ε =  2.5ε =  100ε =  
No impulse 0 0.087 0.469 0.791 
Percentiles receiving a preschool 
impulse 
    
1, 10, 25 0 0.015 0.072 0.297 
10, 25, 50 0 0.064 0.547 0.85 
25, 50 , 75 0 0.095 0.589 0.852 
75, 90, 99 0 0.143 0.619 0.855 
Percentiles receiving a tertiary 
impulse 
    
1, 10, 25 0 0.082 0.451 0.782 
10, 25, 50 0 0.084 0.469 0.794 
25, 50 , 75 0 0.086 0.475 0.795 
75, 90, 99 0 0.091 0.483 0.798 
 
Welfare maximization through the allocation of the preschool impulse is always 
achieved by investing in the lower percentiles except for cases where equity doesn’t 
matter. For the tertiary impulse the picture is not so clear. Skill complementarities 
make investments in students from productive environments more profitable relative 
to the preschool impulse since the heterogeneity of skills is much larger later in life. 
Weather it is optimal to invest in high or low skilled students will crucially depend 
on the value of ε . Societies caring only little about income equality ( 0.5ε = ) maxi-
mize their welfare by investing in high skilled students even though this policy in-
creases inequality. Societies caring more about equity ( 2.5ε = ) are better off by in-
vesting in low skilled students. In that case, the sum of human capital is lower, but 
inequality is lower as well.  
 
In a second analysis it is now assumed that income heterogeneity results from gift-
edness. Table 26 displays the Atkinson indices for different allocations of education. 
In the case when heterogeneity results from giftedness, inequality is much larger. 
The Atkinson indices in table 26 are higher (closer to one) compared to table 24 
Again, inequality can be influenced much better early in life. For the tertiary im-
pulse, investing in low skilled students not always seems to be the best strategy for 
minimizing inequality since the impact of investing in the lowest skill percentiles is 
so small that inequality may even increase. For the preschool impulse this is not the 
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case since skills are still more malleable at young age. Table 27 shows the welfare 
resulting from the different allocations. 
 
Table 25: Welfare for different allocations of education (heterogeneous families) 
 0ε =  0.5ε =  2.5ε =  100ε =  
No impulse 5 923 454 € 5 409 830 € 2 633 510 € 1 237 880 € 
Percentiles receiving a preschool 
impulse 
    
1, 10, 25 8 060 257 € 7 942 168 € 7 483 264 € 5 665 527 € 
10, 25, 50 8 259 578 € 7 731 012 € 3 743 243 € 1 237 880 € 
25, 50 , 75 8 374 675 € 7 576 988 € 3 441 390 € 1 237 880 € 
75, 90, 99 8 549 374 € 7 331 301 € 3 258 487 € 1 237 880 € 
Percentiles receiving a tertiary 
impulse 
    
1, 10, 25 5 986 552 € 5 494 650 € 3 287 546 € 1 304 286 € 
10, 25, 50 6 019 252 € 5 515 688 € 3 195 423 € 1 237 880 € 
25, 50 , 75 6 049 279 € 5 530 462 € 3 175 237 € 1 237 880 € 
75, 90, 99 6 114 744 € 5 555 995 € 3 159 739 € 1 237 880 € 
 
Table 26: Atkinson indices for different allocations of education 
(heterogeneous giftedness) 
 0ε =  0.5ε =  2.5ε =  100ε =  
No impulse 0 0.110 0.570 0.843 
Percentiles receiving a preschool 
impulse 
    
1, 10, 25 0 0.077 0.502 0.823 
10, 25, 50 0 0.087 0.617 0.875 
25, 50 , 75 0 0.119 0.674 0.889 
75, 90, 99 0 0.209 0.758 0.915 
Percentiles receiving a tertiary 
impulse 
    
1, 10, 25 0 0.108 0.574 0.847 
10, 25, 50 0 0.107 0.571 0.845 
25, 50 , 75 0 0.109 0.576 0.846 
75, 90, 99 0 0.117 0.589 0.85 
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For the preschool impulse, welfare is maximized by investing in the most capable 
students for societies caring little about equality ( 0.5ε = ) and by investing in the 
most disadvantaged students for societies caring more about equity ( 2.5ε = ). For the 
tertiary impulse, basically the same strategy is optimal as for the preschool impulse. 
However, the 1st percentile is so weak in accumulating skills due to skill comple-
mentarities such that a society with 2.5ε =  maximizes welfare by only investing in 
the 10th, 25th and 50th percentile. 
 
Table 27: Welfare for different allocations of education (heterogeneous giftedness) 
 0ε =  0.5ε =  2.5ε =  100ε =  
No impulse 6 123 024 € 5 452 233 € 2 633 510 € 959 896 € 
Percentiles receiving a preschool 
impulse 
    
1, 10, 25 6 911 212 € 6 381 070 € 3 442 495 € 1 226 222 € 
10, 25, 50 7 692 631 € 7 020 010 € 2 944 030 € 959 896 € 
25, 50 , 75 8 622 144 € 7 600 823 € 2 811 825 € 959 896 € 
75, 90, 99 11 233 024 € 8 889 667 € 2 714 208 € 959 896 € 
Percentiles receiving a tertiary 
impulse 
    
1, 10, 25 6 152 356 € 5 485 649 € 2 619 466 € 943 648 € 
10, 25, 50 6 196 634 € 5 531 781 € 2 655 656 € 959 896 € 
25, 50 , 75 6 249 443 € 5 571 100 € 2 650 794 € 959 896 € 
75, 90, 99 6 408 734 € 5 660 055 € 2 643 676 € 959 896 € 
 
6.2. Educational and Social Policies to Reduce Inequality 
In this section, educational and social policies to reduce life cycle earnings inequal-
ity are compared. Suppose for simplification that a society consists only of two 
countries with two individuals: the 10th and the 90th percentile. The policy maker 
wants to reduce the 90-10 inequality ratio from 3 (country A) to 1.89 (country B). 
To achieve this reduction in life time earnings inequality we will to compare three 
alternative policies. Policy 1 is a monetary transfer to the 10th percentile taken from 
the 90th percentile. Policy 2 is an exchange of educational inputs between the two 
members during their childhood and in policy 3 the government takes money from 
the 90th percentile but instead of transferring it directly to the 10th percentile it sup-
plies additional education during childhood. In the following we thus compare these 
policies and discuss their relative superiority. 
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It is first assumed that educational inequality arises from heterogeneous families. In 
country 2 the sum of the accumulated human capital of the 10th and 90th percentile is 
1,651,937 € (see table 20). To reduce the 90-10 ratio to a value of 1.89 the 10th per-
centile needs to have a discounted lifetime income of 575,588 € and the 90th percen-
tile an income of 1,076,349 €. Table 28 compares the three different policies for the 
10th and 90th percentile. 
 
In policy 1, wage inequality is reduced through a monetary transfer in period 18. 
The 90th percentile simply transfers 163,631 € to the 10th percentile, thus reducing 
the 90-10 ratio to 1.89. In policy 2, wage inequality is reduced by an educational ex-
change. The 90th percentile gives up some education which the 10th percentile re-
ceives. Table 28 illustrates this educational exchange for the preschool impulse and 
the primary school impulse described earlier. For a reduction in wage inequality it is 
sufficient for the 90th percentile to transfer 0.131 educational units. Recall that one 
educational unit was defined as one year of schooling.  
 
The reduction in the discounted lifetime income of the 90th percentile is smaller in 
this case than in the one caused by the monetary transfer in policy 1. Thus, a very 
early educational transfer can be a Pareto improvement compared to a direct mone-
tary transfer in period 18. However, an educational transfer after period 6 (e.g. a 
transfer of primary school units) leads to a loss in discounted lifetime earnings for 
the 90th percentile which exceeds the amount of money this person would have paid 
in a direct transfer. Compared to earlier periods, the skill level of the 90th percentile 
in later periods is significantly higher relative to the 10th percentile and skill com-
plementary causes skill investments for the 90th percentile to be much more produc-
tive as well. Thus, unlike an exchange of education in early childhood an exchange 
during middle to late childhood will be inefficient. 
 
Policy 3 gives the 10th percentile an educational transfer as well, but instead of redis-
tributing education from the 90th to the 10th percentile, the government takes money 
from the 90th percentile in period 18. In this policy, a debt is made from the capital 
market in order to buy education for the 10th percentile and later on, in period 18, the 
money is demanded back from the 90th percentile. According to table 21, policy 3 is 
a clear Pareto improvement as long as the educational impulse for the 10th percentile 
is bought in preschool or in tertiary and secondary school. 
 
However, sending the 10th percentile student to university for achieving a compensa-
tion in wage inequality is not efficient because at that age, the learning multiplier 
and skill complementary are already too small and additional educational invest-
ments have only a negligible effect. To sum up, the best strategy for reducing ine-
quality is to buy education for the 10th percentile at a very young age and let the 90th 
percentile pay the costs in later periods. 
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Table 28: Comparing three different policies to reduce inequality 
(heterogeneous families) 
 
10th percentile 
Policy Period of Policy Educational 
transfer 
Monetary trans-
fer 
Change in dis-
counted lifetime 
earnings 
Policy 1 18 0 + 163,631 € + 163,631 € 
0 until 5 + 0.131 0 + 163,631 €       Policy 2 
6 until 12 + 0.2334 0 + 163,631 € 
0 until 5 + 0.131 0 + 163,631 € 
6 until 11 + 0.2334 0 + 163,631 € 
12 until 17 + 1.32 0 + 163,631 € 
 
Policy 3 
18 until 21 + 28.6 0 + 163,631 € 
90th percentile 
Policy 1 18 0 - 163,631 € - 163,631 € 
0 until 5 - 0.131 0 - 162,840 € Policy 2 
6 until 12 - 0.2334 0 - 229,040 € 
18 0 - 6 015 € - 6,015 € 
18 0 - 9 517 € - 9,517 € 
18 0 - 47 792 € - 47,792 € 
 
Policy 3 
18 0 - 612 810 € - 612,810 € 
 
If skill heterogeneity arises from giftedness, the human capital profiles are different. 
Now a monetary transfer from the 90th to the 10th percentile of 167,465 € in period 
18 is required to reduce inequality from 3 to 1.89. The value differs slightly because 
heterogeneous giftedness produces different profiles of human capital across life. 
Table 29 compares the effects of the three policies described above for the scenario 
with heterogeneous giftedness. Policy 2, an exchange of education, is impossible 
since the amount of education required for the 10th percentile in order to reduce ine-
quality to the desired level is larger than the education the 90th percentile receives. 
 
Therefore, again policy 3 is the Pareto optimal strategy for reducing inequality. 
However, this policy is only Pareto dominant compared to direct redistribution as 
long as education for the 10th percentile is provided in preschool or primary school 
education. The reason for this is that the ability of the 10th percentile to use educa-
tion is rather low. Therefore, the best strategy for reducing inequality is to buy edu-
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cation for the 10th percentile at a very young age and let the 90th percentile pay the 
costs in a later period. 
 
Table 29: Comparing three different policies to reduce inequality 
(heterogeneous giftedness) 
10th percentile 
Policy Period of Policy Educational 
transfer 
Monetary trans-
fer 
Change in dis-
counted lifetime 
earnings 
Policy 1 18 0 + 167,465 € + 167,465 € 
      Policy 2 0 until 5 + 0.64 0 + 167,465 € 
0 until 5 + 0.64 0 + 167,465 € 
6 until 11 + 1.19 0 + 167,465 € 
12 until 17 + 7.26 0 + 167,465 € 
 
Policy 3 
18 until 21 + 130 0 + 167,465 € 
90th percentile 
Policy 1 18 0 - 167,465 € - 163,631 € 
Policy 2 0 until 5 Not possible 0 Not possible 
18 0 - 29,387 € - 29,387 € 
18 0 - 48,520 € - 48,520 € 
18 0 - 262,853 € - 262,853 € 
 
Policy 3 
18 0 - 2,782,635 € - 2,782,635 € 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we try to connect the economic literature on human capital formation 
with the biological and psychological literature on early childhood development and 
self-regulation across the life-span. Our basic framework for assessing the distribu-
tion of age-specific returns to investment in skills is an elaboration of the model of 
skill formation from Cunha, Heckman et al. (2006) over the life cycle. We illustrate 
the cumulative and synergetic nature of skill formation in a life cycle framework 
where learning abilities differ with respect to age and may differ between individu-
als and where individuals face heterogeneous environments. The formation of cogni-
tive and self-regulatory skills is modelled by two equations of skill formation over 
the life cycle which are flexible enough for studying differences in synergy and in-
terdependence in the formation of skills. Student achievement scores and human 
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capital are modelled explicitly as a function of cognitive and self-regulatory skills. 
Institutional aspects of labour markets which may shape the distribution of human 
capital are taken into account in the simulation model.  
 
The impact of age-dependent educational investment polices which aim at enhanc-
ing individual skills are evaluated in terms of their longer run multiplier effects. In-
dividual educational choices are investigated for tertiary investments to maximize 
human capital, while for preschool, primary and secondary education the impact of 
different investment strategies are assessed without a particular model of choice. 
Various age- and skill-specific educational policies are appreciated with respect to 
individual returns to education, with respect to the overall accumulated human capi-
tal of the population of individuals and its distribution between the members of soci-
ety. The parameters of the simulation model are adjusted in a way such that the for-
mation of intelligence and self-regulation across the life span in our population of 
seven individuals reproduces facts and stylized facts from the development of the 
cognitive and self-regulatory skills, the student reading achievement scores from 
PISA 2000 and the inequality of wages in Germany in 2004, among others.  
 
Our findings are in line with the interpretation of skill formation in Cunha, Heckman 
et al. (2006) and illustrate further the role of different investment strategies for ex-
ample in self-regulatory skills. Skills beget skills and early investment has the high-
est returns to education. If our society of seven individuals wants to maximize the 
sum of the additional human capital formed by limited additional resources for in-
vestments in education, the best strategy is to either invest in students from a bright 
environment or with bright learning abilities. If the goal is the maximization of the 
relative returns to each individual, limited resources for additional educational in-
vestments should be directed to the most disadvantaged first in a world where the 
reason of heterogeneity is the environment. If heterogeneity stems form individual 
giftedness investments should again be directed to the most gifted individuals first. 
 
Differences in individual giftedness thus have a higher impact on inequality than 
differences stemming from the environment. This is a result of the basic properties 
of the technology of skill formation, of self-productivity and of direct complemen-
tarities. Obviously, these findings have important policy implications. If the source 
of heterogeneity stems from varying individual abilities of transforming educational 
inputs into new additional skills instead of socio-economic heterogeneity of fami-
lies, compensating policies directed, for instance, to equity goals need much more 
resources to be successful. A reasonable strategy for fostering human capital is to 
supply children with symmetric impulses into cognitive and self-regulatory skills 
until they reach adolescence. In adult age, however, more investments should be di-
rected to improve self-regulatory skills. In a model variant it is illustrated that in-
fancy might be even more critical for acquiring self-regulatory compared to cogni-
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tive skills. In this model variant skill formation in early childhood becomes even 
more important for shaping human capital over the life cycle.  
 
A further analysis indicates that if it is not possible, for whatever reasons, to invest 
in early childhood, an increase in life expectancy seems to enhance returns of terti-
ary education specifically for students from disadvantaged environments. The rela-
tive gains from tertiary instead of primary additional education seem to be the higher 
the longer life expectancy lasts. The incentives to attend a tertiary education are the 
largest for gifted individuals from favourable environments in countries where the 
labour market leads to a high wage inequality. High labour market inequality gener-
ally increases the returns to education. If labour market inequality is too small, the 
benefit for attending a tertiary education can turn negative. 
 
Our simulation based evidence contributes to the understanding of the skill multi-
plier and the shaping role early childhood has for human capital formation, growth 
and inequality. This is done in a synthetic, controlled world. Even though we tried to 
adjust the model world in a way that it hopefully captures some aspects of human 
capital in Germany, we regard our approach only as a first illustration. In future re-
search, improved longitudinal and cross-section data, both experimental and non-
experimental, could be collected to upgrade the empirical understanding of the cu-
mulative and synergetic nature of skill formation and the way families, schools and 
policies shape the future workforce.  
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